Greece votes for a dream, and it is only that

The news that Greece looks like getting a far-left government let by the soft communist Syriza Party has excited some commentators, but what is perhaps most deceptive is the claim that it is a "rejection of austerity", as if the choices to Greek people were like a menu.

In fact, the choices are far more stark, because what Greek politics is and has been ever since it joined the Euro (indeed one could say ever since it joined the European Economic Community), is an exercise is mass deception and reality evasion.

The troubles of the Greek economy are not due to "the Germans", nor are they due to "the bankers", they are due to the peculiar, though not unique, mismatch between the part of Greek society that wants money from the state (and protection for their businesses or jobs), and the part that doesn't trust the state at all, to the point that it egregiously evades taxation on a grand scale.

This mismatch used to be managed by stealthily stealing from most ordinary Greek people through continual devaluation of the drachma. 

Then it was covered by structural adjustment transfers from the EEC/EU, as Greece gained money to build transport, energy and civic infrastructure, and of course the ongoing subsidies for its agricultural sector.   When it joined the Euro, the Greek government gained access to easy borrowing in a hard currency at low interest rates, so it ran further deficits.  The OECD describes Greece's economy as thus:

In Greece, economic difficulties go deeper than the direct effects of the recent crisis and fiscal consolidation is urgent. Difficulties have been brewing for years, so when the crisis came, Greece was significantly more exposed than others. Besides the severity of its fiscal problems, Greece has, over the past several years, gradually but persistently lost international cost competitiveness, resulting in widening current account deficits, a deteriorating international investment position, and a poor record of inward foreign direct investment. 

Greece has a highly regulated protected economy, with a bloated state sector. 

Syriza wants to protect the economy even further, increase the state sector even further, cut taxes and thinks that banks in other countries, supported by taxpayers in northern European Eurozone states, will help Greece out.

There are, in effect, two paths.

Either a renegotiation of existing loans to be written off or extended is achieved, and Syriza quietly folds its promises on state sector pay, free electricity (indeed any further giveaways), and Greece remains in stasis.  or

Greece defaults on debts and leaves the Euro.

In the former scenario, it looks like at best Greece might get some easing of terms of debt repayment, but the idea that it will get half of its debt written off again, is unlikely, given the previous deal saw private Greek government bondholders accept a 50% write down of debt.  There is little real chance the Greek government could get anything from the private sector, so any further loans will be government to government.  

If Greece gets the sort of deal Syriza hopes for, it will set a precedent that Spanish, Italian, Portuguese and even French and Belgian governments will want to replicate.  At that point, you would have to wonder how much tolerance voters in Germany, the Netherlands, Finland would have for propping up their profligate southern neighbours (let alone the former communist bloc countries that went through much more radical and painful structural reforms than Greece should be facing). 

The real risk is that voters in those countries eject governments that agree to bail out other governments with their money.  After all, who wants to be seen to be bailing out Italy?  German guilt over the war can't be stretched that far.   It threatens unravelling the Euro and even the entire EU project, as parties like Syriza effectively want a fortress Europe that looks closer to the former COMECON than a customs union.

The latter scenario has seemed less likely, but I'm not so sure.  A deal gets offered to Greece that extends the terms for existing loans, in the hope that Greece engages in reforms, but ultimately Greece will run out of money.  At that point, it faces either not paying its pensions or public sector workers, or issuing a new currency, and then the Greek economy finally collapses under the weight of its fundamental contradiction.  A western European standard of living cannot be sustained with an economy that is akin to a wealthy developing country, 

The only solution to this is to reduce the costs of doing business, address the corruption within the regulatory/subsidy/state contract/tax system, remove protection for existing businesses (and jobs) and to cut the role of the state, while enabling the state to be more effective in carrying out its core responsibilities.

However, the outgoing Greek government only made modest progress on this, and Syriza is philosophically opposed to making life easier for the private sector.  Syriza believes in the state owning larger businesses and licensing/protecting smaller businesses.  It believes in a generous welfare state and public sector, and wants lower taxes on everyone except the "rich", who of course have either already left or have at least set up their accounts in a way that they are away from the hands of the taxman.

Even if Syriza does get a deal that avoids a default, it will only delay the next crisis.  An anti-business, anti-free enterprise party will continue to strangle Greece just like similar policies have done for many years.  

What's bizarre is that Greece's northern neighbours have faced much more serious levels of reform and restructuring in the past twenty years than it needs to, but they did it.  Bulgaria and Albania are both much poorer than Greece on a per capita GDP basis, but have economies in much better shape. 

The tragedy is that too many Greeks have voted for a dream that they too can convince taxpayers in other countries to buy them a standard of living they don't earn themselves, and that they can convince banks and other private investors to risk their money with a government that is unwilling to pay them back.  It is a dream, and it is about to become a nightmare. 

What I wrote before about Greece, two years ago, remains true.  

What went wrong with Greece

Greek voters have rational choices, but they reject them

Greece's tragedy should be a lesson to all

Greece for dummies. Austerity = living within your means

Greek crisis is a taste of things to come

Greece is collapse under the weight of its own contradictions

Greece's socialism catching up

Cyprus bail out - the good, bad and the ugly

Cyprus has a stay of execution, I say that because its banks will never be the same again.  Indeed, if ever there was a case to allow full reserve banking (whereby loans = deposits, albeit with precious low returns if any), this is it.  Cypriots will want banks that exist purely to protect their money from being stolen, not banks that risk just that.  

Allister Heath has pointed out that there are some good dimensions to this deal, it is a lot better than how it was looking a week or so ago.  

The Good

- All deposits of 100,000 Euro or less are safe.  Given this was an ECB guarantee across the Eurozone, and the ECB has ensured this elsewhere, this was a minimum responsibility.  It may not be the wisest promise, but it was that. This will, at least, mean that most Cypriots have their savings protected, although plenty of businesses will get hit.

- As only two banks are in trouble (albeit two of the biggest ones), depositors for banks other than Laiki and the Bank of Cyprus, have their deposits untouched altogether.  Good.  It was a nonsense to effectively "nationalise" all bank deposits, including those of banks that are not having difficulty meeting their obligations.

- Shareholders of Laiki bank lose the lot, and bondholders get their bonds replaced by equity, as low as that will be. 

- Taxpayers are no longer solely responsible for bailing out the banks, but rather there is an orderly wind down of Laiki back, with depositor accounts transferred to an inheritor bank - the Bank of Cyprus.

In short, instead of a tax on all deposits, only depositors above the insured threshold of banks that need bailouts, get hit.  

The Bad

- Actual deposit insurance is not being triggered, rather there is just an exemption for those under 100,000 Euros (and larger cuts for those above it).  It saves taxpayers (as insurers), but it does disproportionately hit depositors when there is insurance that could be used to offset that.  Still, the state shouldn't be insurer anyway.  Allister Heath reckons it would have been better to wind down the banks completely, figure out a flat percentage of deposits across all accounts needed, and then used the insurance to recompense those under 100,000 Euros.  

-  There still isn't a legal place for basic "safe" banks to operate outside the fractional reserve banking system economically.  Many people would be happier, especially now, to have money sitting in a zero or near zero interest rate bank account that didn't face these risks.  These events ought to have accommodated that.

The Ugly

- Capital controls.  I said enough about that yesterday.  When removed, there will be grand capital flight.

- With what is about to happen, it will kill off Cyprus being a financial hub for a generation.  Just as well the country has good beaches and olives.  Maybe it will think again about rejecting the UN brokered deal to reunify the country with the Turkish occupied north.  That, along with Turkey being an obvious trading and investment partner (although the Greek Cypriot community may fear being overwhelmed), could help revitalise this country.   Many will lose jobs and find themselves floundering as a result, but they will pick themselves up.

- The rhetoric around "Russian money launderers" will haunt the EU and the ECB for many years.  It is one thing to have concerns and beliefs, another to air them without presenting evidence and without taking regulatory steps to address them.  To sweepingly act as if Russians with money in Cypriot bank accounts are all criminals is an unwarranted slur.  If there is substance in this, and the ECB cares, then there should be Eurozone wide directives to cover this.  

- Cypriot public debt will be at 100% of GDP by 2020 at best, given it is borrowing 10 billion Euro from the Eurozone to cover all of this.

- Cyprus has agreed to increase corporation tax to 12.5%, reducing its competitiveness.

Capital controls - the tool of the statist

"An economic and political disgrace" is how City AM editor, Allister Heath, describes it.

I call it theft.

Capital controls, a euphemism for banning you from taking more than a sliver of your property out of a particular country.

They are motivated by concerns over the "public good", over "the long term stability of the economy", when in fact the mere fact of introducing them speaks volumes about the latter, and is contrary to the former.

It is the logical end point of the moral turpitude of statists, whose fundamental belief is that private property, really, doesn't exist, but is tolerated and can be confiscated, controlled and shared as long as it fits the big picture, the grand plan.

The plans of politicians who think they know best how to run your life.

Cyprus has no future as a financial hub.  Confidence is utterly destroyed, as depositors, regardless of whether they individually will lose part of their savings as part of the bailout, will abandon its banks.

It's over.  Runs on banks happen because people panic about their property and their savings.  That money is their's, and they frequently worked hard and took time to make that money. 

They rightfully seek to protect it, withdrawing it from institutions that might take it from them, because money is an extension of the self.   It is the product of people's minds and labour, translated into a universal medium of exchange, and a means of storing that value.

Being able to take it out of a country is an extension of the right to leave, the right to take your life includes taking your possessions, includes your bank account.

Of course, banks are not foolproof.  In a free market, people rightfully take a risk in deposits with banks, particularly given virtually all banks engage in fractional reserve banking, lending much more than they take in deposits.  If a bank fails, then depositors should become unsecured creditors effectively being a segment of the new shareholders of the bank.

However, it is quite another thing for a sovereign state to do this, to restrict ALL capital flows out of a country.

You see the primary reason why a government does that is because it knows it has lost the confidence of its people, because it is about to steal from them in one way or another (in this case not through devaluation/QE of the kind propounded by Paul Krugman, Russel Norman and Robert Mugabe).  

It is a sign of failure, the tool of the statist and the act of a scoundrel.

Cyprus in a nutshell

This is my go at summarising this.  Obviously, if someone spots something fundamentally wrong with my analysis, please leave a comment.  I don't profess to be an expert on the Cypriot financial sector.

Cyprus took a light regulatory touch to financial services, so its sector grew.

It gained a reputation for providing only the minimum level of scrutiny needed to comply with European banking rules, hence it tended to attract substantial deposits from Russians keen to keep their money away from Russian authorities.

Cypriot banks grew from this, but invested heavily in Greek public debt as a “safe” investment.

Greece approached bankruptcy, and the Eurozone (Germany) and Greece agreed on a bailout plan that meant its bond holder (those who lent money to the Greek government) would take approximately a 50% cut in their bonds.   This shared the burden between Greek taxpayers and Greece’s creditors.

Cypriot banks have been hit by this “haircut” in their investments, effectively being on the edge of folding without ongoing liquidity support.

The ECB is willing to provide some of this, but is demanding that investors in Cypriot banks take their share.  However, Cypriot banks issued few bonds, so simply demanding Cypriot bondholders take a cut wouldn’t be enough.  So the suggestion was made to take a cut from those who loaned money directly to Cypriot banks – in the form of depositors.

This runs contrary to the pan-Eurozone  guarantee for depositors up to 100,000 Euros.  

The reason given for wanting to confiscate Cypriot depositors is because “most of them are Russian” and “we don’t know where their money came from”.   Concerns that never translated into legal action, and which are at worst racist suspicions.

So now the Cypriot government faces its financial system collapsing.  It is happening now because the previous, communist led, government kept its head in the sand until the election it knew it would lose.

The Cypriot government itself does not have high public debt or a serious budget deficit.  It is not due to rampant overspending, but rather a banking sector that can’t cope with the bailout package for Greece demanding it write off substantial assets.

The Cypriot government is looking to the Russian government to save it, which from the ECB’s point of view means it wouldn’t be willing to provide ongoing liquidity, which means a real risk of a Euro exit, unless Russian support is substantial indeed (to the point where Russia would be the central banker for Cyprus, just think about that for a moment).

To get ECB support, it needs to find money from somewhere and could get it from a levy on deposits over 100,000 Euro.  

If no solution is obtained by Monday and the ECB stops providing liquidity, Cypriot banks will collapse and the Cypriot government may choose to print its own currency to cover spending, meaning a disorderly exit from the Euro by a country that – in itself – did not have a budget.  

Conclusion?

Cyprus’s financial sector is finished, regardless of what happens.   Local and foreign depositors wont trust its banks in most scenarios.

1. If Russia saves Cyprus, and it remains in the Euro, then it will likely mean a substantial withdrawal of deposits from Cypriot banks.  They will shrink, and Cyprus will have a bunch of effectively Russian owned banks operating within the Euro.  It is hard to see the ECB being willing to support this.

2. If Russia saves Cyprus, and it is forced to exit the Euro, then Cyprus will have a nearly worthless local fiat currency that does far more harm to depositors than a levy on Euro deposits.  It is over for Cyprus’s financial sector, but it will become remarkably cheap to holiday and buy land in Cyprus.

3. If the ECB saves Cyprus, along with Russia (providing the Cypriot share), then Cyprus will have a shrinking financial sector. Russians will be looking elsewhere to put their money.

4. If the ECB saves Cyprus, with a bank deposit levy, then Cyprus will see a massive run on its banks, and the financial sector will be effectively finished.  

5. If neither the ECB nor Russia bail out Cyprus, the banks will default, depositors may lose most of their money, it will be forced out of the Euro, and faces considerable civil unrest.

Who to blame?

- Greece, for being fiscally incontinent and being unable to pay back its debts.

- The Eurozone, for being unwilling to guarantee to Cypriot depositors what they guarantee to other Eurozone depositors, on grounds that it was never willing to address in the past.

- Cypriot banks, for being profligate lenders

- Cypriot depositors, for trusting the Eurozone and its government to ensure they avoid moral hazard.

-       Authors of the Euro, for not anticipating the inevitable credit bubbles a pan-economic fiat currency, driven by German economic performance, would fuel.

What to watch?

Monday.  The Cypriot Parliament and the ECB.

My bet is that Cypriots will be dealing entirely in cash in a week's time (they already increasingly are).

The Prodigal Greek has a great summary of the measures taken or soon to be taken, that will ensure this.

Cyprus is far too important to get wrong

One of the claims constantly touted by enthusiasts of the European Union is the much exaggerated claim that the EU and its predecessors "kept the peace in Europe" after two major wars.   There is an element of truth in that, simply because countries and people that trade more, travel more and do business with each other in ever increasing frequency, are less likely to tolerate the sort of mindless aggressive nationalism that is the hallmark of so much war.  There can be little doubt that free trade and movement of people and goods within the EU is good for that (although overwhelmingly it was NATO that has kept the peace in Europe, and both it and the EU failed demonstrably to do this in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s).

That peace prize is looking a bit fractious, as the actions over Cyprus in the past few days have indicated.

Let's be clear, I think taxation is legalised theft, in any case.  More insidious is the legalised theft of state sanctioned inflation and regulated interest rates, which are currently effectively stealing savings from the public in the UK.  13% of the value of Pound Sterling has been eroded in the UK alone, by inflation, about double that if you compare it to the US$.  

The British Labour Party and Liberal Democrats both believe in a wealth tax, taking money from you because you own a particular asset over a set value.  

Now the EU, having promised that the first 100,000 Euros of deposits of everyone's bank accounts are protected by government deposit insurance, is going back on that and pushing for the confiscation of 6.7% of bank accounts located in Cyprus up to 100,000, and 9.9% on deposits above that.

Consider what you would do if that happened to you.

You'd be angry, very angry, and some of that anger might be directed towards whoever you thought was responsible.  Banks, officials, politicians.

The wealth tax is to bail out the Cypriot banks, which overextended themselves, particularly being used by many larger depositors from Russia seeking to avoid scrutiny over transactions that may be illegal in other jurisdictions.  

Of course the real answer to this would be to led the banks fail, then the deposit insurance scheme would kick in and those with deposits over 100,000 Euros would lose it all. Which is the right thing to do.  However, the problem is that Germany, indeed the Eurozone believe it must bail out banks within the Eurozone.  This effort is a clumsy attempt to put some of the cost upon Cypriots, especially clumsy because it is unique to Cyprus (Greek, Spanish, Portuguese and Irish depositors haven't had to pay), and because it sets a new precedent.

Who now believes bank deposits are safe in Greek (who believed it before?), Spanish, Portuguese or Italian banks?  There is ever chance of a run on bank deposits in some if not all of those countries, and in the Euro itself, putting those banks in jeopardy and devaluing the Euro some more.

One claim is that the basis for this proposal was that Cyprus didn't want to upset Russia, by letting the banks fail or claiming the bailout by a far larger clawback from large depositors.  I doubt whether Russian depositors will be trusting Cypriot banks from now on in any case.  

A run on the banks will expose not only the lack of liquidity in banks to give you back your money, but the inherent risk in fractional reserve banking.  That being that banks issue credit for which they have no deposits, to an order of several times the value of deposits.  When those borrowers can no longer repay their debts,  consider how that affects your ability to recover your deposits.

What next?

The law of unintended consequences may unravel in the coming days, as banks in the Eurozone periphery start to see a panic appear, as people start to take out their savings, in fear Greece, Italy, Spain or Portugal could be next, or Ireland.  Once people see queues at banks in those countries, they will join them, and there will be a snowball effect.  Their own national politicians may not be trusted, certainly the ones in Brussels wont be.  The more they get told it wont happen to them, the more they will point at Cyprus and say "actually myself and my family are more important than your empty promises", the more it will get worse and worse.

I believe the only way this can be stemmed is either to honour the 100,000 Euro deposit guarantee (and slam deposits above that level), or for Cypriot citizens to be guaranteed that amount alone (leaving foreign holders of accounts to take the hit).   The price for that would be paid by Eurozone taxpayers elsewhere, and I'll let them decide how to treat the politicians who decide better to thieve from northern Europeans than from southern Europeans.  There is only so much of this Germans will take as perpetual penance for a war that most of them were born after.

Resolution of this issue must happen within the next day or so.  Imaginations will wander, rightfully, after that.  Bear in mind Italy doesn't have a government.

Otherwise it becomes unthinkable.  Long lines of Europeans outside banks that close due to running out of banknotes, a general public becoming anxious that their savings are inaccessible.  How long before a brick is thrown, or a firearm brandished, and people demand access to vaults and safes?  

In other words, how long before the average, law abiding, middle income citizen discovers what an abject fraud it is to trust their politicians, and those in Brussels to look after them, rather than to protect people from failure?

Meanwhile, the damage is done to Cypriot banking.  Who now would place a deposit into a Cypriot bank?  What Cypriot is taking a cheque or cash and putting it into a local bank?  How many Cypriots are now changing their future banking arrangements to banks elsewhere (and how many are not in a position to readily do so?)?

Stepping back, how's that protection of peace in Europe looking now, when a small but sizeable proportion of Greeks embrace fascism it is easy to ignore, but when confidence in the Eurozone banking system plummets, does Brussels have reason to continue to prance about with this hubris about all the good that it has done?

UPDATE:  The Cypriot Parliament, which must vote on this law, wont do so until Friday.  Cypriot banks will remain closed until then.  Will this trigger panic more widely?  What would you do?

Italy's long decline

So Italians have voted primarily for the socialist, the corrupt philanderer and the comedian (whose main joke is that he isn't even standing because he has a conviction for manslaughter).   The socialist opposes austerity, the philanderer opposes it too, promising to reverse tax increases and give everyone their money back (nice try) and the comedian wants to halve the working week and give everyone free internet access.  For Italians to have bothered supporting any of these buffoons is comedy extraordinaire.

Italians don't trust politicians or bankers much, but also are averse to change.  It's why on the one hand public debt in Italy is over 120% of GDP its private debt is very low.  Around 30% of Italians don't have bank accounts, because of a history with a Lira that past government simply inflated away, so they don't trust their savings with banks.  Italians don't take our credit to pay for a holiday or a car, they save, they have tightly integrated families.  There is a lot to be said for not borrowing to consume, and the tradeoff of the intact families is a female employment rate 12% lower than the EU average.  Whether the stability of families offsets the loss of economic and human potential from low employment of women is a moot point.

However, on the government side Italy is a disaster.  It has had fiscal incontinence for many years, so needs to get spending under control.   Mario Monti was the man appointed by the European Commission to sort the country out - and he was punished for that by his party coming a distant fourth.  Not, because he is not respected, but because he was a tool of Brussels.  The European Union, the great arrogant entity that proclaims whenever it can that it kept the peace in Europe, now has on its record the imposition of rule from Brussels upon a Member State.  That wasn't going to last.

Yet Italy's problems are deep and cancerous, with endemic corruption, of which Silvio Berlusconi is only the leading figurehead for.  Of a labour market that would make unions in the UK, US, Australia and NZ groan with envy, but which effectively makes it nearly impossibly expensive to make people redundant, and so keeps so many Italian businesses just below the threshold for such a law to come into place.

European Union peace prize?

Oh how I laughed, so much, when I read that news.

Whilst I understand why the Nobel Committee gave the EU the Nobel Peace Prize, it is, quite simply, wrong.

The peace in Europe since 1945 was due to the following:

-  The complete unconditional defeat of Nazi Germany by the US, UK and USSR (with a little help from partisan resistance groups);

-  NATO (and France outside NATO). Keeping the USSR and the Warsaw Pact at bay, especially after the Berlin airlift;

-  The economic integration of Western Europe since 1945 facilitated by the USA through the Marshall Plan, followed by the forerunners of the EU and the GATT/WTO.

There would have been no EU without the unconditional defeat of Nazi Germany, or rather no peace unless you would have counted a unified Europe under Hitler.  

There would have been no EU without NATO deterring the eastward roll of the Red Army by Stalin, using strategic and tactical nuclear weapons.  There would have been no peace either.

There would have been no EU without the commitment of West Germany's post-war leaders to economic reconstruction, a business friendly environment, and to face up to what happened.   To that end, for Greek protestors to fly swastikas because they don't like being told their government might want to keep spending within limits of what it raises in revenue, are dead wrong.

There would have been no EU without the United States providing the aid, providing the foundations of NATO, providing the bulk of the nuclear deterrent, providing support for the GATT (now WTO) to force open global markets in manufactured goods (the core of the Western European economy in the 50s and 60s).

Yes, the EU has helped bind former warring states together, it has also enabled there to be some recognition of mutual values  (however flawed they are in interpretation and application), of free speech, freedom of religion, belief in open liberal democracy, belief in the separation of powers (judiciary, executive, legislature and police), and a broad acceptance of liberal values that reject state racism and sexism, but overwhelmingly are opposed to authoritarian rule.  Yes, there are many ways that is flawed and inconsistent, but compare it to Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America.  Compare it to half of Europe before 1989.

But as the Saturday Daily Telegraph said, it has hardly got a glowing record when faced with major threats to peace and security.

The Nobel committee’s citation explicitly referred to its work in Yugoslavia. Yet Europe largely wrung its hands on the sidelines, until the US ended the bloodshed and forced a peace, as it later did in Kosovo. More recently, in Libya, it was Britain and France, not Brussels and Baroness Ashton, who acted as liberators – again with America’s support.

The EU did not bring down the Berlin Wall, the people of east Germany did after Gorbachev made it clear the USSR would not support east Germany continuing to oppress its people, and east Germans had spent decades watching West German TV and listening to radio from West Germany, the UK and the US.

In Yugoslavia it took US military action against Serbia for the genocide to cease and for Milosevic to stop "ethnic cleansing" of Bosnia, parts of Croatia and Kosovo.  However, it is important to note that one reason many Europeans, in continental Europe, support the EU, is because they have relatives who in living memory endured occupation by the Nazis, or lived under fascism of one kind or another, and have been sold the idea that the EU has stopped all that.  Conveniently, of course, whitewashing out the key role the United States has played, in money and lives, in keeping half of Europe relatively free and staying steadfast to allow almost all of the rest to be relatively free now.

On economics, the liberating movement of the EEC/EU in bringing down barriers among members have been somewhat matched by new barriers with the outside world.  The Common Agricultural Policy, essentially a scam that enabled France's antiquarian farming sector, propped up by grotesquely generous subsidies to pacify (and avoid a perceived fear of Marxist revolution in the countryside), to survive thanks to German, British and Dutch taxpayers, meanwhile dumping subsidised produce on the rest of the world, shutting out efficient producers beyond quotas and tariffs and contributing to environmental degradation and higher food prices in Europe.  The EU maintains massive programmes of vanity projects, like Galileo to replicate GPS and more recently efforts to replicate US, Japanese and European state programmes for earth observation satellites.  It dares demand austerity in the Eurozone whilst seeking annual increases in its own budget beyond inflation.   It's own politicians and senior officials, partly hand picked by national politicians engaging in patronage, enjoy lavish lifestyles travelling in luxury, feeling self important, whilst being ever so distant from those who pay for them.

Now it is printing money, demanding some Member States eviscerate their own private sectors with tax rises whilst trimming their public sectors with spending cuts, stating that the Euro -which should simply be a currency - is not an economic project, but a political one.  

I'll let the Telegraph editorial finish my thoughts on this:

Yes, Europe has been transformed over the past half-century – in the committee’s words – from a continent of war to a continent of peace. But that came about largely through the establishment of trade links, the free movement of people, the knitting together of an economic union rather than a cultural one. The irony of yesterday’s announcement is that the single gravest danger to that peace – provoking riots in Spain, demonstrations in Italy, the rise of far-Right movements in Greece – is arguably the European project itself, as it exhausts the Continent’s treasuries to prop up a crumbling currency union. 

The good news is that there is still time for Europe to pull itself out of this grim spiral, to rediscover and reaffirm the shared freedom and shared prosperity that made it such a beacon to the impoverished or imprisoned nations on its borders. If it can do that, it might even deserve such a prize. As it stands, this bauble feels more like a decoration for the headstone of a once noble ideal.

I would say the EU doesn't deserve it, but then given how debased the Nobel Peace Prize is (and has been for decades), then I wouldn't really wish it on anyone unless I was wanting to mock them.  It has become a caricature of what it is meant to stand for.

What's only funnier is the EU-crats, politicians and their lackeys thinking how very deserving they are for their great efforts.  Yet if it continues to be a barrier to prosperity in Europe, if it continues to expound the socialist view that the successful striving saving nations should pay for the deficit ridden corrupt and spendthrift ones, the only thing keeping the EU together is the good will, of Germans, who don't want to be thought of as being like the Nazis.   Right now, they are willing to let a lot of their taxes and some of their savings, be taken for their reputation.  How long that continues, depends on how many of them remain in jobs, remain immune from inflation and turn a blind eye to being called Nazis despite their hard work and generosity.

It is the USA, NATO and West German/reunifed German political leaders that have produced a legacy of peace.  It is the EU that arrogantly presumes that this legacy is immutable.

Who will bail out Germany?

This is the question economist Detlev Schlichter has asked in today’s City AM.

Seems ridiculous right? After all, Germany is bailing out the rest of the Eurozone. Its economy is growing, its budget deficit is low. Greece is the basket case of the Eurozone, with Portugal, Italy, Spain, Cyprus and Ireland not far behind. If you were look at who would be next, both Belgium and France appear on the scene, because both have high public debt, budget deficits and are structurally sclerotic economies (imagine Belgium without the massive EU bureaucracy sucking in money from across Europe and consuming in Brussels).

Germany though? Well yes. It is, once again, wilful blindness to reality. Germany’s public debt is 81% of GDP, this having risen from 61% in 1999. That should indicate that there is a day of reckoning to come. Yes the budget deficit is low, but in an environment of steady growth, low unemployment and very low interest rates (meaning public debt can very cheaply be refinanced), Germany isn’t able to run a surplus. Remember how the Keynesians say that in good times you can run a surplus and pay down the debt you incur in the bad times. Well this is the good times for Germany, and it can’t run a surplus. Why?

Quite simply, the German state is lumbered with the same burgeoning welfare state and social policies that have already been bankrupting its southern neighbours. The difference is that the economic growth Germany is experiencing for now, and the low interest rates are slowing the inevitable slide towards that day of reckoning.

Schlichter points out that in the past four decades “Germany extended considerable, unfunded promises to the populace, mainly in the areas of public health insurance, state pensions and the public care insurance”. He blames this as an inheritance from the Helmut Kohl administration, an ostensibly “right wing pro-business” government. He says it implies effective government debt in excess of 200% of GDP. It is Germany’s ticking time bomb.

The difference with France and the south of Europe is that Germany has a more liberal labour market than all of them, but that isn’t hard. Germany’s state may be more efficient in tax collection and operation than the southern states, with much less corruption, but again that isn’t hard. It was the centre-left government of Gerhard Schroeder that implemented modest reforms (Agenda 2010). He liberalised labour laws, reduced the size of the welfare state and reduced regulation. Merkel has been unable to continue this further, even though she started her administration in a grand coalition with the leftwing SPD opposition, after he resigned as leader as his party had lost badly in the 2005 election. The message was clear. You don’t get re-elected in Germany after implementing radical reforms.

You can now see why Angela Merkel doesn’t want Germany to be the saviour of the rest of the Eurozone anymore – Germany cannot afford it. German voters are as attached to their big generous welfare state as other Europeans, but they have been immune to actually paying for the full costs. The legacy has been rising debt.

So when the protestors in the rest of the Eurozone think Germany will write them cheques to bailout their own bankrupt welfare states, they are deluded. For not only can Germans not afford that, they can’t afford their own. The difference is that German politicians are hoping that no one notices for now, and that the problem becomes someone else’s. On top of that, German taxpayers are carrying, still, the burden of the deeds of their ancestors as guilt that makes them at least partly amenable to helping the rest of the Eurozone.

The problem is that if German taxpayers/voters and politicians don’t confront their own bubble of debt and overspending, they too will face a crisis. That will indeed be a Eurozone crisis, a European crisis and a global one. That’s if Japan and the United States haven’t dealt with their similar looming crises in the meantime.

Three elections - freedom's not the winner

Greece

I've never seen so much televised election coverage for a Greek election, with BBC News, Sky News and CNN all providing dedicated coverage yesterday.  This was an election about remaining in the Euro - Greek voters, more often than not, wanted to play it safe.

The Greek election result is clear - a country divided amongst those who are scared of losing their savings in Euros to those who want to demand other country's taxpayers support a bloated socialist state, and then a who lot of others who variously want either the government to take over and steal from the rich, steal from the foreigners, or the 1.59% who actually want less government.

So for now, Greece will live off of the back of hundreds of billions of Euros of money from taxpayers in Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Estonia, Slovakia and other solvent parts of the Eurozone, and will attempt to survive with some spending cuts and tax rises - although the former wont be enough, and the latter will choke off the economy even more.  The optimist in me hopes that Greece can actually cut its deficit, balance its budget, open its economy, cut costs and move forward.  However, I suspect Greece will be racked with strikes, mass protests and continued exodus of the best and brightest, whilst the coalition between the two parties that led Greece for 30 years into this mess in the first place fractures as the vested interests both have protected fight for their cut of the borrowed bankrupt pie.

I can only hope that since New Democracy now includes a few elements in favour of less government and not increasing taxes, that the concessions that this government can get from Germany are to not increase taxes more.  That at least will stop choking the private sector more (as cutting government spending is not the same as increasing taxes).   Meanwhile the far left reality evaders, whose xenophobia about foreign capital doesn't extend to foreign taxpayers propping up socialist states, will continue to portray all of this as some grand conspiracy to make foreign bankers rich.  Those "foreign bankers" (Golden Dawn would be proud of that rhetoric) took a 110 billion write off of Greek debt so far, meanwhile foreign taxpayers have effectively restructured most of Greece's private debt into new lower interest rate loans.   However, Syriza and the leftwing xenophobic haters of capitalism just blank this out - and none have any answer as to how to bridge the gap between the Greek government's spending and its tax receipts.   The newly elected Greek government must close that gap, or will face yet another judgment in a couple of years.   The only way it might even hope to do that, and rescue the economy, is to let the private sector flourish by getting out of the way (and doing its proper job when it is expected to do so).

France

French voters have snubbed Sarkozy's party and have voted for the fancy funny land of the Socialists. The party that helped decimate the French stockmarket and chase businesses away when it was last in power in the early 1980s (as Francois Mitterand - the man who instigated the Rainbow Warrior bombing - sought to nationalise major businesses).   France will now either follow the path of Greece, in strangling its already fairly stagnant economy some more, chasing its best and brightest to London, some more, or will actually face reality and introduce reforms that hitherto were too hard for the vain git Sarkozy to introduce.

France is full of myths, one is its great manufacturing sector - which as a proportion of GDP is no greater than the UK's - another it how its mixed economy staved off the worst of the financial crisis - when in fact France has parts of its economy (agriculture and the space sectors in particular) largely propped up by EU subsidies.  

Higher taxes, more regulation to protect those already in jobs at the expense of those without them, and a head in the sand attitude to fiscal balance, will help ensure France continues to lose competitiveness relative to Germany and the world.  It is probably a decade away from its final decisive crisis, as France's generous welfare state and corporatist monstrosity of an economic policy finally collapses in on its own contradictions.  Not much liberte, not so much fraternite, and perhaps egalite of poverty.

Egypt

How's this for a choice?  Want an Islamist President who has vowed to respect other religions, the rights of women and the new freedoms Egyptians went on the streets for?  Or do you want a President from the old guard, the old corrupt militarist regime that kept a lid on freedom of speech and ensured that its cronies were wealthy and comfortable?  Half of all Egyptians chose neither.  It appears that a narrow majority of the rest chose Islamism.

Some on the left in the West who rail in favour of womens' rights, secularism, tolerance, liberal values, peace for homosexuals and the like will celebrate this, to their shame.  Others will share the concern with those of us elsewhere on the political spectrum.

The overriding of the parliamentary election by the judiciary may be worrying, but if the Islamist has won the Presidential election, it may give some impetus for others to vote for a new Parliament that isn't so dominated.

However, I am not hopeful.  The simple reality is that democracy in Egypt is more likely than not to create a state run by those who think religion and state are the one and the same, who hold views of women (let alone gay people) as being subordinate and whose views on Jews, Christians and others who don't hold their religion are less than flattering.   

The result wont be clear until Thursday, but let's be clear - it wont mean more freedom for people in Egypt.

Greek voters do have rational choices - but they reject them (UPDATED)

The two main incumbent parties in Greece, although both supporting the necessary bailout plan, are both institutions that have led the country down a path of corruption, fiscal incontinence and reality denial for too long.  Beyond them, the Greek Parliament is polluted by the likes of Marxists who believe business should all be owned by the state, and fascists who preach bigotry and racism with their faux pride and proto-violent approach to government.

However, there are parties that can make a difference:

- The Liberal Alliance advocates the state withdrawing from business, abolishing permanent employment in the state sector, privatisation and replacement of the state pension with a privatised pension system, along with tax cuts. 

-  The Drasi party supports cutting government spending and free market reforms.

Both parties ran on a single platform in the May 2012 election, but only gained 1.8% of the vote.  This time they are running with the "Recreate Greece" party which is said to share a similar approach to economic policy although being more centrist.  The hope is that the combined support of all three will cross the 3% threshold for Parliamentary representation.

Democratic Alliance would have been another option.  It supports cutting the civil service by a third, abolishing permanent tenure and introducing performance pay.  It also seeks major tax cuts with a flat tax of 20% and negative income tax to replace welfare.   However, it has aligned itself with the incumbent New Democracy Party (the non-socialist one).  Will it have enough influence to make a real difference?  I doubt it.

So the best option appears to be the "Recreate Greece - Action – Liberal Alliance". 

Together they would embrace real austerity that does not include raising taxes, but does include cutting the state down to a size that is affordable, it does mean not scrapping the Euro in favour of a junk currency and means opening up the Greek economy to be more competitive and dynamic.

The two major incumbents support more taxes, the Syriza party supports putting its head in the sand and hoping that Greece doesn't go bankrupt.

In the meantime, wise Greek citizens will be emptying their bank accounts in Greek banks.  Opening German, French and British ones, and depositing their Euros as fast as they can, and holding onto just enough cash necessary to function.   Good luck to them all.

UPDATE:  It looks like a binary choice between New Democracy (in favour of the bailout package including spending cuts, privatisation AND unfortunately tax rises) and the Green Party like Syriza Party which essentially expects to blackmail Germany into paying for its retention of socialist economics.   New Democracy retains a chance Greece remains in the Euro, Syriza is highly likely to see a complete default in late July if it can't convince the Germans to prop them up.

It is entirely plausible that neither could form a government.

That's why it remains the most principled choice to back the Liberal Alliance, for only it will support both less spending and lower taxes.  New Democracy may be less worse than Syriza, but if economic growth matters to anyone in Greece, they can't get it voting for for those who support higher taxes (let alone a bunch of reformed communists).

Greeks withdrawing cash

If anything demonstrates how far we are all removed from free market capitalism and an economic system based entirely on private property rights, one need only look to see the power the state has on the resource most people have as a medium of exchange and storage of value - money.

With speculation rising about the next Greek government quite possibly being led by a quasi-communist who thinks he can call the bluff of Eurozone governments in demanding that they lend the Greek government more money it can't pay back (having already received bailouts worth nearly a quarter a trillion Euro), fear is that the bluff wont work and Greece will be cast adrift, with the Greek government unable to pay its bloated public sector, unable to pay interest on its debt and pushed out of the Eurozone.

With all of that goes any talk of European solidarity, as quite rightly, Germans, Austrians, Dutch, Slovaks, Estonians and the like say no to their government funding Greece's fiscal incontinence, so Greece finds a new way to pay its bills - by printing worthless banknotes likely to be called a New Drachma.

What does the average Greek citizen do then?  Well, Greek banks get all their assets and liabilities redenominated into this junk currency, so the savings of Greek people get utterly destroyed, because of the Greek government.  Greek companies with debts with foreign banks in Euros face bankruptcy as they will be unable to pay debts using the junk currency.  

Many Greeks will seek to flee to live and work in the rest of the EU.

Except the EU has other ideas.  Greeks will be cast asunder, not only having their savings plundered and destroyed by their government, but having their fellow EU partners treating them as foreigners, not worthy of being able to live and work in other Member States.   The grand political project would be over as far as Greece is concerned.  This shameful treatment of people unfortunately stuck in a country that the EU embraced, subsidised and treated fraternally for decades, shows the real limits of the openness of the EU - when the going gets tough, they turn their back on you.

So Greeks are preparing.  With 800 million Euro exiting Greek bank accounts today, this will only accelerate.  Once they have their cash, they will deposit in foreign banks, convert it to gold or silver, or simply stuff it under the mattress.

For you see when it comes down to it, a fiat currency isn't a store of any real value if those who issued it declare it to no longer be so - for it is as easy to destroy that which you printed out of thin air.

For all the SYRIZA party is offering Greece is the promise that all can be made better out of the thin air of socialist economics.

UPDATE:  A former Socialist Defence Minister of Greece is facing charges of money laundering and is facing ongoing investigation for tax dodging.   Is it any surprise that so many Greek citizens actively avoid tax when then is corruption at the highest levels by those who want to spend their money, but make sure they use the state to enrich themselves?  Shame the political choices of Greeks are largely more of the same.

Spain's bailout for dummies

What's gone wrong?  A cluster of Spanish banks loaned money during the credit boom years of low interest rates in the Eurozone to a large number of investors whose investments have now proven to be worth far less than the loans.  Most of this is the property bubble in Spain which has popped, with property values dropping by 30-50% in some places.  The banks are facing insolvency because if they write off the bad loans they will fold.

It is not a sovereign debt crisis of the kind being witnessed in Greece.  In fact Spain's total national public debt as a proportion of GDP is less than Germany's (although it has had a serious budget deficit issue risking escalation of that debt) at 68.5%, although it was predicted to hit 78% at the end of this year.

Whose fault is it?  It takes three to tango this one.  None of these loans would be taken out if people or businesses hadn't borrowed to "invest" in the Spanish property bubble.  Nobody forced them to do this, so they bear responsibility for their own personal tragedy of poor choices and being lumbered with liabilities.  Of course, they wouldn't have received such loans if the banks had been more prudent about their predictions about the property market and had considered the risks of an inflated property bubble.  So the banks bear responsibility for lending money in circumstances that were overly optimistic.  Finally, the European Central Bank sets the interest rates for banks accessing its fiat currency.  As interest rates were set based predominantly on the dominant economic drivers in the Eurozone of Germany and France, this effectively created a line of cheap credit out of nothing at all.   Of course, since the European Central Bank makes money from thin air, it doesn't really bear any consequences of anything, as it is those who own and loan the currency that bear those consequences.

Why should governments get involved?  They shouldn't.  The banks should go bust.  Their shareholders and creditors should bear the losses.  At the most, if there is a deposit insurance scheme, then depositors up to a certain level should be protected, but there is no good reason for governments to do anything other than to have a framework within which bankrupt banks can wind down.   Of course, regional Spanish governments own a majority of the largest bank being bailed out - Bankia - which indicates that it going bankrupt means that those governments lose their "investments".   Naturally, none of them are very keen on this because they want their own decisions to be vindicated.

Why doesn't the Spanish government do it?  It can't afford to do so.  Whilst its relatively new government is eagerly cutting spending (and increasing taxes) to cut the rampant overspending of past governments, it is finding that interests rates on newly issued sovereign debt lie over 6%.   If it was to try to swallow the bankrupt banks it would see its debt as a proportion of GDP slide up by another 9% of GDP bringin it close to 90% (and 100% in 2-3 years' time).  It doesn't want to do that, and claims that Eurozone countries are like a big cozy club that look after one another (although German, Dutch, Austrian, Slovak and Estonian taxpayers might have a wry laugh at how one way that relationship is).

Where is the money coming from for this bailout?  Thin air.  It is part of the slow fiat currency issuing of the Eurozone called the European Financial Stability Fund, which is to become the European Stability Mechanism.   In both cases, they can only lend money to governments, so the Spanish Government will be effectively borrowing from its Eurozone supporters, adding to its public debt, pass on the money to the banks (presumably in the form of capital) and the banks will then pass on that money to the European Central Bank to provide liquidity in the face of their bad debts.  Of course don't think that making money out of thin air and passing it through a merry-go-round has no cost.

Who will pay?  Taxpayers directly in the solvent Eurozone countries (i.e. excluding the PIIGS) and all Euro currency holders indirectly, as they contributed involuntarily to a fund to socialise the losses of the banks.  Spanish taxpayers will be expected to pay too, as they guarantee the repayment of the "credit line", so ultimately will have to pay more unless miraculously the bailed out banks can be sold for more than the bailout funds.  Of course, given Spain's precarious budget deficit, public debt and national economic position, the real risk is that it lays the path for Spain to follow Greece - and so demand more money from Eurozone taxpayers.

Who will win? Creditors of the bailed banks (even if they face major writedowns in their shareholdings).  Owners of Euro debt in Spain.

Who will lose?  Taxpayers across the Eurozone, who collectively will see more of their future earnings diverted to save bad investments.  Ultimately this means the Eurozone economy being dragged down a small notch, again, for many years.  Holders of Euro currency deposits or cash lose as well, because it ultimately contributes to inflation.

What happens next? The markets will lemming like treat all of the propaganda around this bailout as gospel, and get a sudden shot of confidence, until the realise it helps to inflame a sovereign debt crisis in Spain.  The Eurozone economies will be no more better off.  Economic growth will not be facilitated.  The lunatic far-left parties in Greece (including the fascists) will clamour that Greece should get the same support, as will Irish politicians and those in other profligate Eurozone countries.  None will acknowledge that this is not about sovereign debt and actually increases Spain's sovereign debt.  People in France will have voted for a socialist Parliament, which will seek to continue the "print it and bail them out" philosophy that pretends that fiat currencies can be used to just print your way out of recession.  The ideological debate in Europe will continue between three groups:

-  Austerity and Integration:  Led by Germany, it is the view that things will get better if only the PIIGS would follow the policies of the 5 or so Eurozone countries that have budget deficits lower than GDP growth, improve competitiveness and then create a new European Treaty that harmonises budgetary, taxation and economic policies. Spain's current government has tended to share this view too.

-  Profligacy and Integration:  Now led by France, but also driven by leftwing and populist politicians in the Eurozone.  It is the view that the Eurozone should socialise its gains and losses.  In other words, Germany and others should pay for the debts and deficits of the PIIGS, and there should be extensive transfers across the Eurozone, as if it was a United States of Europe.  

-  Disintegration:  A growing view that the Euro is unsustainable in its present form, and the way to resolve the crisis is for it to split into two zones or multiple independent currencies, so that the PIIGS can devalue their way to "competitiveness", and the European project becomes a looser free trade association and customs union.  This is the view of Eurosceptics generally, although there are versions of this argument against any form of open Europe (from Marxists and fascists) or against new small fiat currencies (supporters of commodity-based currencies).

The one thing is sure, don't expects sun to rise and everything to be rosy.  For the Greeks have to vote again to decide if they want to swallow reality and take their medicine, or run away from it and truly see what it takes to become a tinpot backwater that makes Albania look good.

Austerity and the Euro need not hinder growth

So what if I said that there is an economy in the Eurozone that has embraced austerity and is experiencing economic growth.

You'd probably think I mean Germany, given it runs relatively low budget deficits and it is widely believed that the depressed value of the Euro is a boon to Germany's export driven industries.

However, I don't mean Germany.  This country grew by 7.6% in 2011, Germany grew by 3%.

Its public debt as a proportion of GDP is 6%, Germany's is 81%.

It has been a Eurozone member since 1 January 2011.

This is Estonia.

According to CNBC, its economy shrank in 2008-2009 by 18%, as the financial crisis hit hard.  Estonia having had its own credit bubble and property speculation bubble to go with it.  The crisis also made it difficult for Estonia to sustain ballooning budget deficits.  So the government there did what had to be done, it cut spending.

All public sector salaries were cut by an average of 10%, but cabinet Ministers had a 20% cut.  The age to receive the state pension was raised, and labour market reforms introduced.

Things are not all rosy, with unemployment at over 11%, growth is essential just to help pull Estonia up.   Estonia lowered and simplified taxation, with a flat income tax rate of 21% (down from 26% when first introduced in 1994).   Not for Estonia is the pseudo-austerity seen in France, the UK and Greece of raising taxes (taking money out of the hands of citizens and investors) to cut the deficit.  It was spending cuts, shadowed by tax cuts that shrank the state and boosted the economy.

The economy has picked up as technology firms have emerged, growing an IT sector that is thriving.  For an economy that was once based on being a colony of the USSR, Estonia now rates Finland and Sweden as its biggest export markets.

Estonia has thrived following real austerity, and it has thrived still even having moved from a minor fiat currency to a major one.  The Euro has not been a problem, as Estonia increased in competitiveness not by destroying the savings of its citizens by printing money, but by increasing productivity, reducing waste in the state sector and making it easier to do business.   

Let's remember that Estonia's economy has twice been decimated in the last 20 or so years.  First by independence from the USSR which saw most of its industry shut down for being inefficient and obsolete, and secondly by the bursting of its credit bubble in 2008.  In both cases the reduction in GDP was greater than that experienced by Greece today.  Greece, after all, put aside dictatorship in 1974, not 1991 (nor was Greece occupied for 50 years).  Estonia has had much less time to get its act together, and until 2004 it was not a member of the European Union either, so neither enjoyed the completely open market, nor the offer of subsidies for agriculture or infrastructure that Greece has supped from for many years.

Estonia has per capita GDP less than Greece, real wages lower than the Greek minimum wage and its farmers receive subsidies which are one-third of that, for the equivalent properties, of those in Greece (or indeed France or the rest of the EU-15 - those EU Member States that were never part of the Warsaw Pact or former Yugoslavia).  

So Greece ought to embrace real austerity.  Cut its state sector.  Don't hike up taxes, but rather reform them to simplify and lower them - minimise exemptions, but lower rates and fewer taxes.  

Secondly, talk of exiting the Euro would be unnecessary as an alternative.  For a bankrupt state that can't keep its spending aligned to its revenue can't manufacture a fiat currency that will be trusted by anyone.  It will be like remaking the Zimbabwean Dollar.  

Finally, the Cato Institute has rightfully fisked Paul Krugman's misuse of statistics to claim Estonia was hit by austerity, when the recession it faced was prior to any austerity.  The President of Estonia, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, has since called Krugman "smug, overbearing and patronising".

So isn't it about time that journalists took the over-quoted prick on some more?

Check out Mr Ilves's wonderful tweets damning Krugman in this Huffington Post article - bear in mind this is in English and not Mr Ilves's first language, but he runs rings around any current leaders of English speaking countries I know of.   Bear in mind also that he is a centrist in Estonian political circles.  He is no libertarian, he is no radical, but the mainstream of Estonian politics is fiscal austerity, low tax and low levels of regulation.

Finally, Mr Ilves wrote convincingly on the Hoover Institution (Stanford University) website about how his country got to where it is, with some damning of those on the left in the West who thought people in the USSR simply loved living under the authoritarian yoke of the CPSU (point fingers at Sue Bradford and friends).  He points out the issue that countries like his are being expected to contribute to bailouts for countries with higher per capita incomes than Estonia.   How long will taxpayers in those countries tolerate that?  The answer is that they shouldn't.

In short, the clear point is that there are European countries that had it far harder for far longer than Greece, have "followed the rules", and have been reaping the benefits of the hard work involved in rebuilding a productive economy with much less government.

If eastern Europe gets it (and not all of it does), does it mean that in future, the term "southern Europe" will be a synonym for stagnation, corruption and economic malaise, more than the east?

Furthermore, what does it mean when voters in Greece and France choose governments that essentially campaign on forcing voters in other EU countries to pay for their profligacy?

UPDATE: Anonymous below points out that income tax in Estonia is not all it seems as employer social security contributions are 33% on top of income tax, which is obviously a heavy burden.   See more on Estonian tax here.

France in denial on its long path of stagnation

The Economist got it right when it had its cover page with the very title “France in denial” and today City AM’s Allister Heath said it more clearly about the French Presidential election:

“The useless Nicolas Sarkozy was given a bloody nose; the awful, economically illiterate Francois Hollande is in the lead...there is no pro-capitalist, pro-globalisation, low-tax, Eurosceptic, outward looking party in France... what passes for the centre-right in France is social democratic and fanatically pro-EU”. 

 Quite. A look at the candidates for President says it all. If I was French I couldn’t stomach any of them. Of the ten candidates, three are communists (Melenchon, Poutou and Arthaud), one is fascist (Le Pen), another a conspiracy theorist/quasi-fascist (Cheminade), two are liberal socialists (Hollande and Joly), one is a soft "moderate" socialist (Bayrou) and the other two are conservative "Gaullist" socialists (Sarkozy and Dupont-Aignan). What a choice! It's about "how would you like your more government sir, with a red flag, black shirt, green banner or just some more tax and protectionism?" 

Whether they embrace the EU or reject it (and there are plenty in that group rejecting it, because they see the EU as a free market capitalist project), they all support an economic nationalist fortress France, they all support more taxes (Sarkozy’s “austerity” programme has been mostly about tax increases and he embraces financial transactions tax), they all reject free trade - the free movement of goods, services, capital and people. They all, to a greater or lesser extent, paint the bogeyman not overspending governments that can’t keep their fingers off of the credit cards to bribe voters with borrowed money, but the new scapegoat “the bankers”. They all paint any alternative involving less government as “failed Anglo-Saxon” policies, despite the fact that manufacturing as a share of GDP is the same in the UK as in France, it is just the UK industries are more numerous and smaller than the grand state owned or subsidised industries that are national champions. 

The French story is one of despising capitalism, but as the Economist points out, it is rather contradictory:  

The French live with this national contradiction—enjoying the wealth and jobs that global companies have brought, while denouncing the system that created them—because the governing elite and the media convince them that they are victims of global markets. Trade unionists get far more air-time than businessmen. The French have consistently been told that they are the largely innocent victims of reckless bankers who lent foolishly, or wanton financial speculators, or “Anglo-Saxon” credit-ratings agencies. Mr Sarkozy has called for capitalism to become “moral” so as to curb such abuse. Mr Hollande has declared that his “main opponent is the world of finance”. Few politicians care to point out that a big part of the problem is the debt that successive French governments themselves have built up over the decades.  

The forthcoming contest between Sarkozy and Hollande is really a matter of how much more socialism do you want for France? Bearing in mind that part of France’s socialism, its molly-coddled rural sector, is actually funded by German, British and Dutch taxpayers through the EU. If Sarkozy wins, and he unilaterally implements a financial transactions tax, he will chase the financial sector from Paris to London and Zurich tout suite. If Hollande wins, he will do that and more, with a new 75% top tax rate (at 1 million Euro) just to make sure the message is clear – France doesn’t want really successful entrepreneurs (which of course, the 250,000 or so French expats in London already know), and he is looking to lower the pension age, just when it is clear how big a demographic problem France has in paying state pensions in the future. 

What both offer is a different speed of the process that Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece followed for the past couple of decades, of growing the state, growing spending, growing taxation and pretending that this works. France’s GDP per capita ranking in Europe has slipped in recent years, now between the UK and Spain/Italy. It hasn’t run a budget surplus for nearly 40 years, and its visibility in the international marketplace for services is low, despite it being the largest component of the economy. Public debt is 90% of GDP, it has the largest state sector in the Eurozone at 56%. It has banks chronically exposed to bad debts in the Eurozone periphery which are grossly undercapitalised. Its labour costs are 10% higher than Germany’s, but French unemployment is 10%, Germany’s is 5.8%. France hasn’t had unemployment less than 7% for 30 years – putting a lie to the socialist myth of how caring a big state is with strong labour rights. The Economist suggests neither of the two leading candidates will address these structural problems: 

 “If Mr Hollande wins in May (and his party wins again at legislative elections in June), he may find he has weeks, not years, before investors start to flee France’s bond market. The numbers of well-off and young French people who hop across to Britain (and its 45% top income tax) could quickly increase. Even if Mr Sarkozy is re-elected, the risks will not disappear. He may not propose anything as daft as a 75% tax, but neither is he offering the radical reforms or the structural downsizing of spending that France needs.” 

 Furthermore, if France embraces an agenda of protectionism, closing borders, higher taxes and more subsidies within the EU, it will clash with the German, British, Dutch and Danish visions of what the EU should be. It will, fundamentally reveal what has long been the underlying tension in the EU – those who want to use it as a shelter and as a super-government to fund their own national rent-seekers, and those who see it as part of a project to break down borders of trade and travel (a third group see it as a source of money to milk while their economies are relatively poor - yet French farmers get three times the subsidy per capita as Polish farmers, as part of a compromise because expanding the Common Agricultural Policy to pay for 12 new states would have bankrupted the EU).

Germany calls the shots in the EU today and can be expected to block such nonsense, but what is next for France? 

Five years of Hollande chasing away business, with more stagnation, more credit rating drops and disappointment that he can’t mould the EU in the image of nationalist socialism? 

Or five years of Sarkozy fiddling enough to stop things sliding too fast, playing lip service to his own nationalist rhetoric, but by and large representing the status quo or slow progressive decline? 

What’s most repulsive is how popular fascism remains, seen now when Sarkozy – son of a Hungarian immigrant – talks of “too many foreigners” in France to woo voters from the seductively dangerous Marine Le Pen, despite he himself having spent five years embracing the political union that facilitates open migration among 27 countries. 

Or indeed the popularity of communism, with a sixth of voters choosing options that have been tried, tested and delivered misery and poverty across half of Europe. What does it say about the desperation of French voters who are swamped by the miasma of stagnation that they blame foreigners or businesspeople, and think a strong authoritarian leader will save the day? Where have we seen this before?  Fortunately, most French voters will never embrace fascism or communism proper, but they are almost infantalised to think politicians, with advice from those educated at the closed shop École nationale d'administration (Civil service school), can fix their problems with more laws, more spending and more taxe.  (Perhaps it is the philosophy behind THAT school that needs to be investigated)

Whatever does happen, one thing is abundantly clear, the future French President and forthcoming government will not be friends of capitalism, free trade or open markets. They will continue to seek protectionism at the price of French consumers and taxpayers, the unemployed and those who fund the EU. France will be the most strident force in international trade against free trade, less subsidies, more transparency and smaller transnational government. More strident indeed than even China. The question is to what extent it gets ignored and sidelined as it embarks on its continued process of relative economic delay, or if it ends up slowing the Western world down with it, given its prominent role in Europe. Given how central France is to supporting the growth of the EU project, and how it is the single loudest opponent of liberalisation of trade in agriculture, it is fair to say that, for those of us in New Zealand (and indeed in all efficient agricultural exporting economies), France will continue to represent the biggest stumbling block to getting progress in opening up international trade in agricultural produce and services.  For those of us in the UK, it remains the fervent cheerleader of a Federal Europe, and opponent of the UK vision of the EU as an open area for trade and business, rather than a protectionist fortress.

France's Presidential election wont save the French from themselves

Politically France is more of an enigma than many will think. It could be said to be the cradle of democratic socialism in the Western world. With a ridiculously generous welfare state (unemployment benefit is paid at 70% of the salary of the previous job), spending over 28% of GDP on welfare, a relatively interventionist industrial policy and retention of state owned companies operating major services, it is seen by many on the left as a model. 

France of course has also long been at the vanguard of support for closer European integration. Its unalloyed support for the European Union would suggest that the people of France regard it as critical to their economic future. Yet the truth would appear to be a bit more subtle than that. Whilst the Common Agricultural Policy gives France 10 billion Euro a year in subsidies for its farmers (and indeed it was creation of this policy that was critical to France delaying the UK’s entry into the EEC – because France wanted Europe to pay for its own ruinous subsidy scheme), French voters clearly have mixed feelings about the EU. The main selling point of the EU to them has been a fortress Europe mentality. EU laws to set minimum employment standards, to regulate competition and to keep out imports and foreign competition are what they want. Compare that to the UK which has seen the European project as one about lowering borders between countries and liberalising markets.

Indeed it is this clash of ideologies that is at the heart of the European project battles. Guess which view took hold in Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal. Late last year France briefly looked like it might fall victim to the sovereign debt crisis, but austerity measures were introduced that bear little resemblance to those elsewhere. It almost entirely involved raising taxes, and French voters hardly blinked. Indeed, the socialism ingrained in French popular thinking has been seen in the popularity of the socialist candidate for President, Francois Hollande, who has sought to bribe voters with more welfare, earlier retirement, more subsidised jobs all paid for by higher taxes (top rate of 75%!) and the tooth fairy of future sovereign debt default paid for by German taxpayers. The reality evasion has been delusional, but he has been ahead. Until now. 

Whenever anyone blames the US for a lack of political sophistication, they should pause for a second. For what else can explain the sudden rise of Nicolas Sarkozy in the opinion polls, as he switched tack so profoundly and cynically it would destroy a similar politician elsewhere. An objective view of Sarkozy is that he has been, by and large, a status quo President. He did undertake some modest reforms around pensions, but by and large has made little effort to reform the French socialist state. His largest profile has been in supporting the revolution in Libya, in banning the niqab and his partnership with Angela Merkel in dragging out the Eurozone crisis. However, he found new life in campaigning as if he wasn’t President, but a new candidate. 

His new policies include:

 - Withdrawing France from the Schengen agreement (which means France has no controlled land borders) if other members did not adequately control illegal immigration; 

- Saying there are “too many foreigners” in France, demanding immigration be cut from 180,000 a year to 100,000 (which of course France can’t control whilst it is in Schengen); 

- Demanding a “Buy European Act” requiring EU governments to buy EU goods and services, and if not agreed he’d establish a “buy French Act”; 

- Opposition to halal meals at schools or swimming pools having separate hours for men and women to meet demands of Muslim users; 

- Demanding all kosher and halal food be labeled so consumers can avoid it if they wish.

 In short, he is seeking to take votes from ultra-nationalist candidate Marine Le Pen, who believes in strong state ownership of strategic businesses, radical protectionism, withdrawal from the Euro, boosts for subsidies for French business and agriculture, a looser EU, withdrawal from the Schengen area, a moratorium on immigration, withdrawal from NATO and a closer relationship with Russia. The result, he is now ahead in the polls. Let’s be clear, he can’t implement most of what he said without effectively withdrawing France from key EU provisions on freedom of movement and open markets. So if he is re-elected, he wont actually do most of this. France wont leave the Schengen area and France wont be able to introduce a “buy European” law, because it will be opposed by Germany and the UK. However the support gained for a “fortress France” suggests that even French voters are not too warm to the EU. 

What is most striking though is how French voters are not as cynical as one would have hoped. Sarkozy could have held these positions for years and could have done something about it. He didn’t, and now he is remodeling himself to be the nationalist “with reason”. Presuming it will be him up against Francois Hollande, it is clear neither has any solutions to confront France with its decades of reality evasion. For France’s economy remains anaemic, its best and brightest leave because of taxation.

Its much vaunted manufacturing sector is, in fact, no bigger as a proportion of GDP than manufacturing in the UK (the difference is UK manufacturing largely involves rather smaller firms, with a few exceptions, whereas France relies on larger firms with high profiles). Meanwhile, public debt in France is creeping ever higher above 85% of GDP, and France has not had a budget surplus for over 30 years. For all of the Airbuses (which are propped up by the EU and have a significant part of their componently manufactured in other countries), TGVs, Renaults, nuclear power plants and armaments, there are precious few service industries that export and few IT startups. 

France may provide final assembly for nearly half of the world’s jetliners, make some trains and cars, weapons and satellites, but in all but one of those markets, it faces serious competition in export markets. Meanwhile, its own media is gagged by laws on privacy that make it difficult to take on politicians, despite the extraordinarily lavish lifestyle and corrupt practices that appear to be the norm at the top. France’s socialism does have a semblance of the totalitarian personal aggrandisement of Marxist-Leninist regimes. 

Ultimately, when France faces reality it will probably be overwhelmed by a belief that it is capitalism and free markets that have brought the country down. It will seek to demand the EU save it, somehow, by shaming the Germans into thinking they owe France because of the war. It will dabble with the idiocy of economic nationalism, and find it sliding further into stagnation. France wont abandon the EU, because no politician has the courage to take on the lobby of the largest group of corporate welfare parasites in the EU – French farmers. A group French taxpayers can’t afford to prop up on their own. The question French voters ought to be answering is this. Do they vote to hurry along this inevitable confrontation with the unsustainability of French socialism, by voting for Mr. Hollande? Or do they keep it decaying at a steady pace with Mr. Sarkozy? 

In either case France's future looks like Greece does now.  I suspect by then that Germans will be rather fed up being made to feel guilty for a war that none of them remember, and which they have long expressed penance over.   They also wont think their own taxes should go to pay for a country that has stubbornly resisted restructuring, true austerity and liberalisation for far too long.