Transmission Gully - The Real Story - Part 4

In Part 3 I summarised the funding that Transmission Gully cost far more than previously estimated and how Transit and the Wellington Regional Council responded to that – by calling for a more comprehensive study into transport along the corridor. I also summarised the government’s additional funding for Wellington transport, without the Western Corridor. In this part I go through the key study findings and what it really means. As submissions on the draft Western Corridor Plan are due in by Friday 4 November, I thought I better accelerate these posts in case anyone wants to make a submission. Details on the study are available at the Greater Wellington Regional Council website for the project

The Western Corridor Transportation Study

The Western Corridor Transportation Study goes through the basic stages of public policy analysis:

- Problem definition;
- Option identification;
- Option analysis;
- Recommended packages.

The project has three phases:

- Initial consultation (identifying issues, priorities and options that the public wanted considering);
This stage screened out options that were not worthy of further consideration (including electrification of the rail line to Otaki and converting Akatarawa Road into a major highway) and provided the raw data for putting together packages of projects that were complementary.

- Scenario testing (development of different packages of projects and consultation on those).

- Development of draft corridor plan (a preferred package for consultation).

This package has been consulted on by Transit and the regional council, with submissions closing on Friday.

The purpose of the study is to reach a Western Corridor Plan to be adopted by Transit and the Greater Wellington Regional Council. Another part of this is that the findings about the best transport options would inform advice to Ministers about what level of additional taxpayer funding should be provided for the Western Corridor.

Key findings

In terms of problems along the corridor, the key findings are:

1. Ngauranga Gorge has the worst congestion by far.
2. Traffic growth is greatest through Paraparaumu/Waikanae.
3. Trip reliability is the biggest issue of public concern– not safety or regular consistent congestion.
4. Paremata/Mana will be eased by the current improvements, but congestion will be back to current levels within ten years.

Congestion is low between Plimmerton and Mackays Crossing. Yes I know sometimes you get delayed for a short period on some evenings there, but on average, the traffic flows relatively well. Congestion at Pukerua Bay is starting to emerge at peak times, but congestion between Pukerua Bay and Mackays Crossing wont be serious for a bout 10-15 years. The biggest issue for the public is the route remaining open. Congestion is far more serious south of Tawa and particularly south of Johnsonville.

In addition, the main safety concerns largely relate to intersections on the highway (particularly between Raumati and Peka Peka) and the coastal stretch of highway.

Solutions

The key findings in relation to options are as follows:

1. The main weaknesses in the rail link are the single track sections between Pukerua Bay and Raumati. Passenger rail service frequency can be increased to 15 minute intervals at peak times to Paraparaumu only if some double tracking is carried out from Mackays Crossing to Raumati ($40 million). Further double tracking from Pukerua Bay to Paekakariki would improve reliability (as the line would be at capacity) but would cost another $280 million more – this is hardly worth it.

2. Rail alone wont fix congestion, as rail improvements will shift 500 people a day from car to rail, but only remove 100 vehicles from Ngauranga Gorge at peak times. At best some low cost enhancements (bigger park and ride) and improvements that would happen anyway (new trains and more frequent services) may delay growth in congestion, but beyond that rail improvements are very expensive and will deliver little.

3. Completely free flowing road capacity between Kapiti and Wellington at peak times will reduce rail patronage by 10% and will probably increase congestion south of Ngauranga.

4. North of Mackays Crossing, the Kapiti Western Link Road would reduce congestion in Paraparaumu and Waikanae, and improve reliability by providing a second crossing of the Waikanae River. In the longer term, an expressway following much of the current highway would reduce crashes and further relieve congestion, including providing options to bypass central Paraparaumu and Waikanae townships. There is little debate about this and Transit has the Kapiti Western Link Road – Stage 1 – in its 10 year State Highway Plan.

5. South of Linden, the Petone-Grenada link road would improve linkages for freight between the Hutt and the north, and the Hutt and Porirua, as well as providing congestion relief for the most congested parts of the Western and Hutt Corridors (Ngauranga Gorge and Ngauranga-Petone respectively). Petone-Grenada was the MOST ECONOMICALLY EFFICIENT PROJECT evaluated in the study – it would generate the same level of benefits as Transmission Gully, but for only $180 million. Dr. Cullen and Peter Dunne might want to debate this, but it does show what value there is in politicians keeping out of the way – it is clear that the Petone-Grenada road is well worth building.

Now the real debate is between Linden and Mackays Crossing.

The BIG issue Gully vs Coast- same benefits, different cost

Some of the biggest myths need reiterating here. The best projects on the Western Corridor are NOT on this section. There are far greater benefits in building Petone-Grenada and a Kapiti expressway than either Transmission Gully or 4-laning the coast road. Simple as that. Why? Because the congestion at Ngauranga Gorge and between Hutt and Ngauranga is worse, the congestion in Kapiti is growing faster, and the crash rate in Kapiti is higher than along the coast road (plus the coastal crashes can largely be prevented by a median barrier).

Most roading projects in New Zealand proceed not because of politicians (hilarious seeing local MPs claiming credit for new roads – Winnie Laban and Darren Hughes had absolutely no influence at all on when the Mackays Crossing Overbridge proceeded), but proceed because they are fixing a problem that is worth fixing.

The much maligned Lindale underpass, unfortunately underscoped by Transit and above budget, was built because Lindale was the site of several fatal accidents, and with growth in that area would be the site of more – but Peter Dunne wouldn’t know that. One of the most treacherous sections of highway in Wellington used to be State Highway 2 outside Cornish St in Petone, until Transit resurfaced it with non-slip surfacing, which eliminated a blackspot – but Peter Dunne wouldn’t campaign for such a non-sexy project which actually saves lives for only a few hundred thousand dollars. Petone-Grenada would provide an alternative to the Hutt motorway for people going to the Hutt when that route is congested due to an accident – which happens several times a year – something I would have thought Hutt MPs would care about.

However, back to the central section of the Corridor. The issues are:

Safety: The coastal section head on collisions will be prevented by a median barrier (with some modest widening) which will cost around $16 million. Transit has design funding for this work, which will need resource consents as some of the existing walls and rock structures beside the highway need to be demolished – let's see if the Plimmerton and Paremata Residents’ Associations oppose this one. The other safety issues are intersections at Paekakariki and Airlie Road (Whenua Tapu cemetery), and the exposure to risk in Pukerua Bay and Mana. Paekakariki and Airlie Road are fixed with an overbridge ($25 million) and underpass (maybe $5 million) respectively – Transit is consulting separately on Paekakariki because it does not believe that it can continue with the current dangerous intersection regardless of whether or not Transmission Gully is built, and it is right. Transit also believes that a 2-lane bypass of Pukerua Bay ($50 million) is necessary, regardless of whether Transmission Gully is built – primarily because if it IS built (assuming untolled) 40% of traffic will remain on the current highway. So the main safety issues can be fixed for around $96 million – leaving Mana/Plimmerton still exposed (although safer as the traffic lights provide far safer traffic and pedestrian access for local residents). Transmission Gully would avoid the need for any further work at Mana, and possibly a Pukerua Bay Bypass.

Congestion: Congestion on this section will exist primarily at Mana/Plimmerton, within ten years of the latest improvements being completed, and the merge beyond the yet to be completed Mackays Crossing overbridge. Some modest congestion at Pukerua Bay is also likely where the 4-laning ends. The only way this can be resolved is by either 4-laning the entire route and a bypass at Mana, or Transmission Gully. However, lets get some perspective here. That congestion will be very much peak focused for relatively short periods, it wont be urgent at Mana/Plimmerton for some time, and a 2-lane Pukerua Bay Bypass will ease delays at that point. Congestion relief should not be a priority in the short term, but planning will need to be made to build extra capacity to relieve congestion in the medium to longer term.

Reliability: This is the issue that Transmission Gully proponents talk the most about – they want a third highway standard road into Wellington (there are already two – SH1 and SH2, and arguably Paekakariki Hill Road and Akatarawa Road both provide light traffic alternatives during closure). Another road would certainly improve reliability – but building in such a high level of redundancy for closures that happen only a few times a year, at such a high cost is something worth debating. The reliability problems of the current route are substantially reduced if a median barrier is installed, because it will significantly reduce the rate of crashes – which are the main reason the road gets closed. The crashes will also be located on one side of the road, meaning that traffic should still flow in the other direction.

Slips? These are rare, and the one event in the last year that closed the highway for a considerable period of time was unexpected, but is unlikely to happen again. This is when the option of 4-laning could make a significant difference. 4-laning the highway provides far more road space to undertake work to clear crashes and slips. It is relatively easy to clear a 4-lane highway of any incidents, so much so that the proposed “Reliability” package for the Western Corridor did NOT include Transmission Gully. In short, the reliability benefits of Transmission Gully (remembering it would be steep, with a viaduct along a fault line) are not worth it. Reliability is significantly improved by placing a median barrier along the coastal route and a flyover at Paekakariki, and would be adequate with 4-laning of the coastal route.

Cost

Now this is the critical one. According to the study, taking into account inflation and factoring in project risk, the comparison is as follows:


Transmission Gully $1.09 billion
Coastal upgrade $735 million (Comprised of Mana Bypass $220 million, Pukerua Bay Bypass $70 million, Coastal 4-laning $365 million, Paekakariki interchange 4-laning $20 million and Grays Road upgrade $60 million)

So there you have it. Since the study finding, a specific report was commissioned to confirm these costs and essentially, nothing bridges the $250-300 million gap in cost between these options. Both routes are about the same length, so no gain there. Both routes would enable 100 km/h travel between Mackays Crossing and Linden. The key difference is that Transmission Gully is a brand new 27km road built along a faultline in rural farmland vs selective upgrades to an existing road, with a couple of new segments along an established corridor and coastline, with some houses that will need to be moved or demolished.

Now note I have assumed a number of givens – that the median barrier along the coastal highway proceeds anyway, and a flyover (2-lane) at Paekakariki also proceeds anyway, but that the Pukerua Bay Bypass does not proceed regardless.

Transmission Gully’s benefit/cost ratio is now less than 0.5:1, it is a worst dog than ever before.

However, the coastal highway isn’t entirely the best project either. Parts of it are. A Mana Bypass is expected to be worthwhile within ten years, as traffic growth erodes the extra capacity benefits from the just completed upgrade. A Pukerua Bay Bypass is also expected to be worthwhile in saving travel time and significantly improving access around that community. However the coastal segment doesn’t generate many benefits and would struggle in itself to get a positive benefit/cost ratio (though is nowhere near as bad as Transmission Gully). The reason being that the only benefit in 4-laning the coastal section is really network reliability – safety benefits are minor and the congestion relief benefits are low as well, at least at current traffic volumes. The coastal section should be done last.

So what now?

Assuming silly arguments such as not doing Petone-Grenada are dismissed, along with refusing to do anything along the current route for safety reasons, there are three options:

1. Develop and build Transmission Gully. This would mean no pursuit of any coastal improvements after the median barrier is built and the Paekakariki flyover. Transmission Gully could probably be completed within 10-12 years.

2. Develop and build the coastal expressway upgrades progressively. The sequencing isn’t important, but would see the expressway completed within 10-15 years, although segments would be open in advance of that.

3. Build neither within the next ten years, but improve the existing highway to be a safe reliable 2-lane route until the economics of either of the above options improve.

Next: What my preferred option is and what funding the Labour government gave for the Western Corridor?

The Tory Party's chance to go forward

With the Tory Party race down to two horses - David Davis and David Cameron (and it all being up to party members now), it is timely to consider what this means for the party that once considered itself the natural party of government in the UK.

While much of the media is treating David Cameron as its darling child, David Davis has upped his campaign by wanting to reduce the size of the British government as a proportion of GDP to below 40%. He also has talked about flat tax, not too seriously mind you, but was floating it. Now the cynic in me says he just wants the votes that went to Liam Fox in the last round – trying to be the right wing candidate. He was never talking much like this before, and frankly I have seen enough conservative/libertarian mainstream party candidates before who disappointed. However, to his credit, he never used the drug issue to get at David Cameron, although it is unclear whether this was because it was more likely to backfire. Davis wouldn’t be bad, he has disowned the bad side of Blairism, the spin, the obfuscation of reality and the nanny statism that it still carries (the latest manifestation being a proposal to require sellers of houses to produce a certificate of fitness or similar so buyers don’t need to get the homes inspected – which, critics say, buyers wont trust anyway!).

Cameron, on the other hand, drips charisma, youth and enthusiasm. He has shown a disdain for mindless authority – his refusal to be drawn into whether or not he inhaled or snorted in his youth, shows some level of maturity. Many old fashioned Tories would have boo’ed him off the stage, before they paid some woman in black leather to dress them in a plaid skirt and stockings and tell them what a naughty girl they are. Cameron’s downside is that he is committed to increasing spending on public services as well as tax cuts – not exactly a trimming of the state, though his message appears to be one the public want to hear.

For me personally, it would be hard to pick between them. Ideologically, Davis is probably in favour of less government than Cameron – but critically, Cameron is more socially liberal than Davis. THAT is something the Tories desperately need. One solution promoted by Davis is for Cameron to be his deputy – there are worse options. Together they would represent a change, and balance each other out – and lets face it, the Tories have quite a majority to overturn to get elected in four to five years time. However, I doubt Davis can overturn it – he might cut it back substantially, but he hasn’t got the “X” factor that Cameron has.

So, reluctantly, I am still convinced David Cameron is the best hope the Tories have – to shed their old Conservative coat and to look less socially anal (and hypocritical). The Tories need to stop playing the closet race card of immigration – which, while a legitimate issue, is seen by too many non-Anglo Saxon migrants, as being racist – a way of tapping the likes who would otherwise support the ultranationalist British National Party. The Tories also need to stop treating homosexuals, single parents and anyone who doesn’t look like they are in a “born to rule” family, like not being worthy of their consideration.

Ironically, despite his Eton background, Cameron is the candidate most likely to do this. I believe with a consistent message, carefully disciplined, the Tories could waltz to victory, albeit a narrow one, at the next UK election. More and more Britons are tiring of Labour’s “tell us what to do” attitude, and Gordon Brown will creep Labour back towards old Labour, and the dynamism of reform that Blair has pursued will wither.

The Tories need this change, it is all they have, otherwise they will die. Blair at the Labour Party Conference this year said “never overestimate the LibDems and never underestimate the Tories” – now it is time for the Tory party membership to prove him right, I just hope that those that are still off their ventilators aren't still wondering why Winston Churchill isn't standing!

Transmission Gully - The Real Story - Part 3

In Part 2 I outlined the commitment Transit made to Transmission Gully, and the steps it took in the interim to ease the problems along the highway given limited funding. Transit also started to pursue Transmission Gully tentatively, gaining a land designation, buying properties and starting to plant trees on parts of the route needed for environmental mitigation. Part 3 looks at the blow out of costs that came from the first detailed investigation into the project, the response to that cost blow out and the start of the Western Corridor Transportation Study. This part also tracks increased funding for Wellington transport under the post-1999 Labour government, up till the Study.

Transmission Gully cost blow-out

Transit received the result of the detailed investigation into the Transmission Gully project in 2004. Instead of costing around $250-$270 million, it now cost around $830 million. Although there was an inflationary element, this would not account for a 350% discrepancy – the project had been underscoped. Building a four-lane motorway along this faultine, with steep gradients, soft earth with hard rock was far more expensive than previously considered. Remember Transmission Gully’s inclines would be as steep as Ngauranga Gorge, but three time as long. The benefit/cost ratio, dropped roughly speaking from 2.3:1 to, at best, around 0.8:1. Remember, 1:1 means the project breaks even. Treasury used to argue in the early to mid 1990s that it was worthwhile to proceed with all projects with a benefit/cost ratio of 2.5:1 or above. Until the late 1980s, projects with a benefit/cost ratio of 2:1 and above were routinely funded. However, Transmission Gully wasn’t just more expensive, it didn't generate any surplus benefits, its benefits didn't even cover its costs - it simply wasn’t worth building anymore.

Even taking into account the two increases in land transport funding committed by Labour (in 2002 and 2005), an $830 million Transmission Gully would be 30 years away. Arguably if nothing was done with the highway over 15-20 years, Transmission Gully would become a viable project, if only because delays would have become extreme - not the pathetic delays for traffic noticeable around Wellington, but the sort of delays London, Los Angeles and Paris encounter - such as 2 hour journey times from Wellington to Paraparaumu.

At $830 million, a toll would now recover less than 10% of the construction cost, and no private investor would want to touch it. While a few Opposition politicians and industry lobbyists argued the reason Transmission Gully wasn't being built was the Land Transport Management Act making Private/Public Partnerships and toll roads difficult to build - the truth was that Transmission Gully generated no serious interest from the private sector- unless central or local government were willing to cough up most of the cost. 90% taxpayer, 10% private sector is hardly a partnership - and no changes to legislation would change what a dog of a project Transmission Gully had become.

Of course the facts didn’t stop noisy commentators insisting that this didn’t matter – Peter Dunne didn’t care about cost. Like any MP seeking political capital, he was keen to spend other people’s money. Kapiti Wellington Regional Councillor Chris Turver argued naively that the cost increase was “Transit’s fault” and that the government should go out to tender and let someone else build it. He was completely ignorant that Transit doesn’t actually build roads, it DOES go to tender to get roads built (and had been doing so for over a decade). Having some responsibility for managing the state highway system, and contracting Wellington's rail system respectively, Transit and the Wellington Regional Council agreed that a more comprehensive analysis was needed of all of the options along the route.

This included reconsidering the coastal option, as it was not reasonable to simply assume that that route increased in cost proportionately. Also, given the Land Transport Management Act, Transit and councils were required to look more broadly than roads – and see what public transport and demand management measures could do. The Western Corridor Study was commissioned by Transit and the Wellington Regional Council - to study all of State Highway 1 from the Ngauranga Interchange to Peka Peka north of Waikanae, and the railway line. It was commissioned to determine:

1. The most serious problems along the corridor;
2. Options available to address those problems;
3. Develop packages of options;
4. Public opinion on the most serious problems and options.

The Study would eliminate options that had little or no merit (e.g. upgrading Akatarawa Road to a full highway or a rail link from Porirua to the Hutt), and soberly consider all of the issues. Despite media coverage to the contrary, it was the first comprehensive transport study of the corridor for decades.

A similar study had been carried out for the Hutt Corridor previously, which formed the basis for the Hutt Corridor Plan, which, broadly speaking, Transit and the local authorities were following.

Maunsell ( a respected consultant on transport infrastructure modelling and design) got the contract for the Western Corridor Transportation Study.

Meanwhile, Transit gained funding for the Mackays Crossing overbridge, at the northern extremity of Transmission Gully – and the part of state highway 1 that generates the most publicity. Another worthwhile project that will reduce congestion, and which would fit it well with either Transmissiom Gully or 4-laning of the existing highway towards Paekakariki.

Meanwhile – more funding

As mentioned in Part 1, Labour changed the funding framework for roading to move from benefit/cost ratios to a more strategic consideration of funding priorities and ultimately funding the objectives of the New Zealand Transport Strategy:

- economic development;
- safety and personal security;
- access and mobility;
- public health; and
- environmental sustainability.

In addition, economic efficiency was to be taken into account. In summary, it meant that while benefit/cost ratios were a useful tool to rank projects, they would not guarantee funding or necessarily stop funding of a project. While the higher the benefit/cost ratio the more likely (and lower the less likely) a project would be funded, the expected final cutoff would be 1:1. No project would be expected to proceed if its benefits did not, at least, equal costs – nor should it. Anyone would be mad to want anything funded that isn’t worth it.

While the funding framework had changed, the levels of funding were also addressed. In late 2003, the government announced a boost in land transport funding over ten years – largely to address Auckland congestion, but also providing funds for the whole country. Auckland would get $900 million of Crown funds, not funds from road users (although as road users nationwide contribute $600 million per annum to the Crown, it can be argued they did pay), over ten years for land transport projects. This meant roads and public transport. In addition, a 5c a litre increase in petrol tax (and similar increase in light road user charges) would provide more funds over that time. That petrol tax/RUC revenue would be allocated towards projects on a region by region basis, according to population – Auckland would get 35%, Wellington around 11% - the argument being that it would provide a pool of funds to accelerate projects in the regions where the petrol tax was being paid. In Wellington this meant around $220 million more over ten years (starting in 2005/06).

Both the Auckland Crown funding and the new regionally allocated funding would be allocated by Land Transport New Zealand (formerly Transfund), taking into account regional priorities. The funds would be available to Transit and local authorities for state highways, local roads and public transport projects. At the time of writing, Wellington councils had yet to fully prioritise where they wanted this funding to go – but this provide scope for more roads to be built. However, given the scale of Transmission Gully, this extra funding would do little to progress it. This is more a reflection of the sheer size of the Transmission Gully project – compare the approximate costs of projects as follows:

Transmission Gully $830 million (the 2004 estimate)
Inner City Bypass $39 million
Mackays Crossing overbridge $21 million
Kaitoke Hill realignment $16 million
Dowse to Petone upgrade $79 million


Wellington transport project

While accepting that there would be more funding forthcoming in 2005, thanks to the petrol tax increase (and a commitment to indexing petrol tax and light road user charges to inflation annually, and all that funding going to the National Land Transport Fund), there was still a major gap between funding and expectations in the Wellington region. This largely was due to desire to progress big roading projects such as Transmission Gully, and the Wellington rail project. The latter in particular had a gap of local funding – Land Transport NZ had effectively committed itself to funding its share (60%) of the basic Wellington rail upgrade package (carriage replacement and refurbishment, station upgrades, other infrastructure upgrades), but the Wellington Regional Council claimed it could not meet its share.

As a result, several Wellington Labour MPs (Swain, Hobbs, Mallard, King) lobbied then Transport Minister Pete Hodgson for a Crown injection of funding for Wellington transport similar to the $900 million provided for Auckland.

Officials of The Treasury, Ministry of Transport and local government worked for several months in a joint process, similar to that which preceded the Auckland package, and concluded in a report that recommended some additional funding primarily for roading and public transport, without specifying a precise amount (but giving a range of options). The Wellington transport project final report also concluded that perhaps $250 million more would have been usefully contributed by the Crown

Cabinet decided to contribute $225 million which would be spent on roading and public transport, including helping the Wellington Regional Council pay for the 40% share of the rail project. The Wellington Regional Council also had to raise rates to contribute – but in effect, this package meant that Wellington’s passenger rail system had secure funding for upgrades for the next ten years. Much of that will be seen in more reliable signaling, integrated ticketing, real time public transport information systems, a second refurbishment of the Ganz Mavag electric rail units and a replacement of the old Johnsonville/Melling line English Electric units in due course (an interim refurbishment is underway now).

The $225 million basically gave Wellington what it needed to maintain and enhance its public transport system reasonably over ten years, but also around $100 million of that was expected to go on roads. Projects such as the Melling interchange (getting rid of the congested set of lights at that bridge), a flyover at the Basin Reserve and advancing stages of the Kapiti Western Link Road were mooted as getting funding from that package – but it would be far from enough to progress Transmission Gully.

In essence, Labour was giving Wellington back about one-third of the petrol tax it took every year for the Crown account – for ten years- effectively 6.3c a litre for every Wellington motorist out of the 18.7c/l that goes to the Crown account. Pretty much a start that National – quantitatively – would find hard to argue against.

However, that $225 million was announced as only the first part of Crown funding for Wellington. That funding would be enough for Wellington, except the Western Corridor (although Western Corridor projects were recognised as benefiting from those funds – new trains would run to Paraparaumu, and some roading projects on the corridor could proceed) – the Minister of Transport said that a further tranch of funding could be made available once more information about what was needed on the Western Corridor existed. That information was to come from the study. Given that the Wellington transport project report recommended $250 million on top of that, it would be fair to say that the benchmark for an increased contribution was that – but until the Western Corridor Study was completed – nothing more could be said.

In two days time (I am away tomorrow): What did the study conclude? What further funding did the Government provide and under what conditions?

Transmission Gully - The Real Story - Part 2

In Part 1 I gave some basic history about the highway and the funding framework for roads in New Zealand, right up to the point when Transit in the mid 1990s had to decide what to do about worsening congestion and safety issues at Paremata. This part proceeds from that point to 2004, when Transit had commissioned a detailed investigation of the cost of Transmission Gully.

Commitment to Transmission Gully 1996-2004

Transit was stuck. As funding had shifted completely from itself to Transfund in 1996, it could no longer be accused of determining its own funding. If any projects were to proceed, it had to bid to Transfund for them and it knew all too well that there was little point punting up projects that fell well below the anticipated benefit/cost ratio cutoff. Even as that cutoff dropped as funding became available, there was an enormous backlog of projects across the country that had not progressed - all projects with far better returns to the country than Transmission Gully. In Wellington, projects like the Newlands interchange, the Kaitoke Hill realignment north of Upper Hutt, the Inner City Bypass and the Mackays Crossing flyover all had a higher priority, along with countless small projects to remove blackspots and the need for many more passing lanes on busy stretches of highway. Transit could either sit back for an unknown period of time and do nothing about Paremata-Kapiti (which many local residents supported, figuring if it got bad enough, the Gully would be funded), or do something fundable now to ease the problem. The problem with do nothing was that, at the time, for Transmission Gully to proceed, it would have meant that delays on the highway would have to have been about an hour each way, every weekday (that is an additional HOUR to travel from Kapiti to Porirua before the project would have been worthwhile). With delays comprising typically 10-20 minutes already, Transit saw that leaving the congestion to grow progressively worse over 10-15 years as being intolerable. It had to act, but it also had to send a signal about the longer term, so the Transit board made a strategic decision that would guide its funding applications to Transfund for several years.

Transit decided that the long term strategic corridor for State Highway 1 north of Wellington was along, a slightly amended (starting at Linden not the current Tawa interchange) Transmission Gully. This meant Transit would pursue a designation under the Resource Management Act for the route to be a motorway with the relevant local authorities, and would seek funding for the initial stages of the project (investigation, property purchases and any pre-construction work).

At the time, this seemed sensible, as the project had a positive benefit/cost ratio (although quite low), was not thought of at the time as being any cheaper than upgrading the current route. The estimates carried out in the 1990s tended to support this. This approach was supported by the Kapiti Coast District Council, Porirua City Council and Wellington Regional Council.

In hindsight, Transit may have been better to commission a detailed investigation of the options at that point, but that is history. The mistake was that the cost estimate at the time was superficial.

At the same time, the then National government's roading policy was to commercialise the management of the state highway network, and allow toll roads to be built. Although investigations showed that tolls would, at best, recover one-third of the cost of Transmission Gully, the idea got some momentum. The regional council in particular saw tolling the route as providing some demand management to restrict the growth in car commuting from Kapiti.

With Transit's strategic decision on Transmission Gully, based partly on an expectation that funding for road construction would not significantly increase in the foreseeable future, Transit proceeded with a strategy of interim improvements to the highway.

However, local residents associations in Plimmerton and Mana opposed all of them. They argued that any work on the existing road would reduce the net benefits of Transmission Gully, and delay that project. Of course there was some truth to that, although the difference between 15 years and 20 years delay for a project seems academic to daily users of the road. However, that strategy had consequences that the Plimmerton Residents' Association probably did not fully understand.

Plimmerton-Pukerua Bay

The highest priority project proposed by Transit was the 4-laning and realignment between the Plimmerton weigh station and Pukerua Bay to address the average 2 fatalities per year from head on collisions (and many more injury accidents).

This section of highway was the most dangerous stretch in the Wellington region. With bends not designed for 100km/h traffic, a camber (surface angle) that often led to vehicles being driven off the road or into each other, and no median barrier, this road needed attention. Transit's analysis showed that it would be a fundable project (a cost/benefit ratio between 4 and 6) and it was a priority, so it applied for resource consents to ease the sharp curves, widen the road to 4-lanes and install a median barrier.

However, the Plimmerton Residents' Association opposed the resource consent, and was prepared to take the case to the Environment Court, which threatened to delay the project by 12-18 months. The Association said the money should go to Transmission Gully. Of course this was nonsense. Funding is prioritised nationally, and the next priority project for funding was hardly going to be Transmission Gully, but probably some other realignment in another region (as it should be) that narrowly missed out on funding that year (but would get it the following year). There was no scope for Transfund to direct Transit to spend around $10 million on Transmission Gully. This wouldn't even have paid for starting construction on the road (property purchase, detailed design and geotechnical surveys are needed first).

The upgrade was delayed for a year, and yes, there was a fatal accident on the highway, which could have been prevented by the project, because the Plimmerton Residents' Association delayed the work. That stretch of highway is far safer today, although an underpass at Airlie Road would be a welcome next step to make that wide intersection safer (although it is far safer than it was before). Had that work not proceeded, perhaps around twelve more people would have been killed on accidents on that highway - even if Transmission Gully had miraculously been started at the time. Even if it was approved today, another 18 would die before the Gully was opened and on average 1 a year after it was opened.

Paremata congestion

After dealing with the most serious safety issue on the highway (Pukerua Bay to Paekakariki had NOT yet become the blackspot it would later be, although Transit undertook some minor works to improve safety there in 2001 including clearer lane and side fence/wall markers and the centre rumble strip), congestion at Paremata/Mana.

The result is the upgrade from Paremata roundabout to the Plimmerton weigh station which is about to be completed. The main congestion problem at Mana is the merge at the bridge (not the roundabout). However, it is also important to note the difficulty of access to and from the highway by local traffic and the effect of the highway traffic on the local community. Transit decided it was less risky to undertake some interim improvements in Mana/Plimmerton now than to do nothing. So it designed an upgrade to make better use of the existing road and improve access. The project was appealed by both the Paremata Residents' Association and Porirua City Council (with later withdrew its opposition) which delayed its progress for around 2 years. However, once the Environment Court dealt with the project, Transfund funded it (it had a benefit/cost ratio over 5:1, but by then Transfund was no longer solely considering benefit/cost ratios).

The upgrade provides a second bridge, a widened and upgraded roundabout at Paremata, 4-lanes from the weigh station to Mana, five sets of traffic lights to improve access to and from Mana/Plimmerton side streets and peak time clearways (not for single occupancy cars) along Mana Esplanade. Transit agreed that when Transmission Gully was fundable, it would remove the old bridge and the clearways.

This project cost around $24 million and will ease congestion, and significantly improve access in the community. However, it is, at best, a 10 year interim solution that makes best use of what already exists. Some would say it is a waste of money, but in 10 years it is estimated that the time, fuel, vehicle maintenance and safety benefits are worth double the cost.

Further progress

Having committed to Transmission Gully in the long term, Transit proceeded to do what was necessary to plan for Transmission Gully - it sought and gained land designation on the route, and started buying properties.

The designation was appealed by several groups, including some local landowners, but eventually was confirmed (one of the major issues was the connection at Linden with the existing motorway). The Wellington Regional Council did impose conditions for the route, including the need for seven years of planting to prevent runoff into the environmentally sensitive Pauatahunui Inlet. Transfund has funded tree planting along the route to meet that condition, although the conclusion of the Environment Court case against the designation saw that condition removed - as is appropriate. The runoff issue needs to be managed by planting, but as the Resource Management Act is effects based, Transit should be able to demonstrate in that it has adequately mitigated the risk rather than simply plant trees for seven years, as it could be done sooner. A report in the Dominion Post that the requirement for seven years planting has gone - as of 2002 - is true, but the requirement to mitigate the runoff from the proposed motorway has not.

Transit started buying properties along the route as they came onto the market. No compulsory purchases have been undertaken, largely because there has been no urgency (as there is no construction funding). It now owns perhaps half of the properties needed for the route, although it is unclear how much of the land area of the route is Transit Transit. Transit's priority has been to acquire the properties needed to undertake pre-construction work.

Transfund has every year funded Transit by several hundred thousand dollars to undertake the pre-construction work for the project, particularly the environmental planting along the route. This planting has now been underway for around three years - about another four years was needed before construction could start on Transmission Gully, even if funding was available immediately.

As a distraction, Peter Dunne in 2001 introduced a private members Bill into Parliament which was purely about building Transmission Gully. It would not have granted funding, or accelerated resource consents, but would appoint a commissioner to progress the project. National, ACT and NZ First all supported it, as opposition parties do, but Labour, the Alliance and the Greens opposed it (correctly) as single Bills to build roads that only create a bureaucratic position are worthless. Several politicians tried to milk this project, despite in almost all cases having voted in Parliament to oppose political interference in road funding decisions. However, with funding still relatively tight, progress on the Gully project was seen as still longer term.

In 2002, Labour introduced a 4.2c/l increase in petrol tax (and 30% increase in road user charges for lighter vehicles) to provide a boost to land transport funding. In effect, that ensured funding in real terms remained at levels similar to 1999/2000, primarily because of inflation and ongoing erosion of fuel tax revenue (because of increased vehicle fuel efficiency). That increased revenue allowed some progress on Wellington projects, particularly the Inner City Bypass, Kaitoke realignment and Mackays Crossing Overbridge, while funding for ongoing property purchases, tree planting and investigation work on Transmission Gully continued.

As part of its prudent management of the project, Transit recognised that there had not been a detailed investigation of the Transmission Gully project which would be a reliable costing for any future funding application. Given that the Labour government had decided to introduce the Land Transport Management Bill (allowing tolling for new roads and private/public partnerships for road financing), the possibility that tolling, private investment and some public investment could progress Transmission Gully was mooted. Political interest was strong, particularly following the 2002 election when United Future pledged Labour confidence and supply (Peter Dunne believed that the Land Transport Management Act would enable Transmission Gully to proceed - when it actually only allowed viable toll roads to proceed).

Transit knew it had to get a better handle on the scope and scale of the project if it was going to be progressed in the medium term. No projects anywhere near the cost of Transmission Gully had been commissioned by Transit before, certainly nothing of that scale had been built since the 1970s, so Transit commissioned consultants to undertake a detailed investigation of the project. This included some actual groundwork to check geological conditions along the route. Given Transmission Gully is a faultline, involves steep gradients and a large viaduct near the top of the route, it was critical to have greater certainty on costs.

However, the results of this study blew the cost of Transmission Gully out of the water. Transmission Gully was not around $250-270 million, nor $300-350 million, not $400 million - it would cost $830 million - and that was a midrange estimate. This changed the situation radically.

Tomorrow: What was the reaction to the blowout in costs? What options were available? How did the funding situation change?

Transmission Gully- The Real Story - Part 1

There has been an enormous amount of noise about this proposed project. This is primarily of interest to Wellingtonians and most of the noise is ill informed. I have been following this project for some years, and have been closely involved in this issue in the past. Unlike most commentators on this, I have read the mountains of paper done on this, and talked to those involved. It is important to have some background and history to see how we got to where we are. Before I do that, I should make it clear I have no vested interest in any outcome on this – I don’t own property anywhere in the Wellington region, or have any stake in any businesses that would gain or lose from the building of any road along this route.

The first installment is some basic history of the highway north of Wellington, how the Transmission Gully option came about and where things got to in the mid 1990s - then a description of the changes to land transport funding that occurred as part of the reforms of the 1980s/1990s, which Labour and National implemented. For those wanting to read the lot, you will find the rest if you search my blog for the other 5 parts.

Background

The concept for a motorway along the route called Transmission Gully had been mooted for decades before serious discussion on the option started in the late 1980s. State Highway 1 out of Wellington had, up till that point, been developed along the corridor known as the Centennial Highway (as it was opened in the 1930s), from the bottom of Ngauranga Gorge through to Paekakariki. The earthworks for both sections were considerable, until that time, the main highway out of Wellington comprised largely what is now Paekakariki Hill Road. It shouldn’t be forgotten that long before this, a track which developed into a highway, now known as State Highway 2 – Rimutaka Hill Road – had also been developed.

It had been developed over that time including the first motorway in New Zealand, from Johnsonville to Tawa, in the 1950s. By that time, Wellington’s rail electrification project had been extended to Paekakariki, with the main trunk line having been shifted from what is now the Johnsonville line, to the twin tunnels between Wellington and Tawa that now exist. The motorway was extended in the late 1950s to bypass Johnsonville and Tawa, and the highway in Ngauranga Gorge widened to 6-lanes in that time.

In the 1950s/1960s, there were grand projects developed by the then National Roads Board (part of the Ministry of Works) for motorway projects across the country. The Wellington-Foxton motorway was designated, essentially including an extension from Porirua towards Mana, a bypass to the east of Mana (behind what is now Camborne), converting the highway from Plimmerton to Pukerua Bay into a motorway, a motorway bypass of Pukerua Bay, widening centennial highway to 4-lanes, a motorway to the east of Paekakariki following the railway line. This would extend to a motorway bypass of Paraparaumu, Waikanae and eventually Otaki and Levin! The proposed Kapiti Western Link Road will largely follow the route set aside for that motorway.

This plan was the basis for developing SH1 out of Wellington from the 1950s until the mid 1990s. In that time, the main improvements to the route were:

- 4-laning (to motorway standard) between Porirua and Paremata in the 1970s;
- Linking Ngauranga Gorge to the Wellington Urban Motorway with the Ngauranga Interchange (1984);
- Installation of a roundabout at Paremata to significantly ease access to and from the highway at that point (1986);
- Replacing the traffic light controlled intersection at Mungavin Avenue Porirua with an interchange (1987);
- Replacing the old ramp bridge at Porirua and the traffic light controlled intersection with a flyover (1994).

With progress on the highway south of Paremata largely in hand, emphasis started to shift to the increasingly congested corridor from Paremata to Kapiti. Growth in Kapiti, encouraged partly by the extension of the rail electrification to Paraparaumu in 1983, had seen a significant increase in car commuters to Wellington from that district.

Neither safety, nor route closures were a significant issue at that time, but the National Roads Board was aware of congestion at Mackays Crossing and Paremata (essentially where 4-lane sections of highway ended) which needed addressing. The old plans for the Wellington-Foxton motorway were dusted off and reviewed, and significant parts were abandoned, particularly north of Waikanae. However, some of the priorities in the 1980s for the next ten years included what had become the Camborne Bypass and the Pukerua Bay bypass. These were seen as the next logical steps and the National Roads Board starting talking publicly about upgrading the existing State Highway 1. It was then that an old idea, that had not been talked about much for decades was revived.

The appearance of Transmission Gully

In the late 1980s, residents of Mana/Plimmerton and to a lesser extent Pukerua Bay started to get perturbed about the plans for large bypasses of their villages, and wanted a solution that had long been forgotten about – a motorway through Transmission Gully - a quiet rural gully that was named after the national grid electricity lines draped along much of its length. Partly due to the uproar about the proposed bypasses, the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment (PCE) undertook a brief study of the options for more road capacity between Paremata and Kapiti, although PCE has no specific role in making decisions, and came to two conclusions:

1. Before any major investment in roading is undertaken, public transport should be upgraded to reduce growth in commuter traffic and to provide a more environmentally friendly alternative; and
2. Only after those improvements are complete, should a new road be built – and it should be through Transmission Gully.

This started the large scale lobbying to shift planning from the coastal route to Transmission Gully - although most Transmission Gully advocates ignore the public transport recommendation. Some early investigations by Transit NZ in the early 1990s concluded that Transmission Gully was probably cheaper than upgrading the current highway. However, upgrading the current highway had the significant advantage that it could proceed in stages to address the most serious sections progressively. For example, much of Transmission Gully effectively duplicates the highway from Paremata to Tawa, and congestion is worst at Paremata. The big safety issue then were fatalities between Plimmerton and Pukerua Bay, where the death rate was several times the national average (Pukerua Bay to Paekakariki did not have a similar rate of accidents).

During the early-mid 1990s Transit NZ was stuck – as local authorities and local residents kept pushing for Transmission Gully –then estimated at around $250 million (very much a once over estimate as no big motorway projects had been built in New Zealand for many years). Porirua City Council withdrew the land designations for the Pukerua Bay and Mana Bypasses.

As Transmission Gully at that cost only had a benefit/cost ratio of 2.3:1 (compared to the funding threshold of 5:1), it would not proceed for many years. Transit regarded the congestion at Paremata to be unacceptable, and started consulting on options to alleviate it. There were three:

1. A 4-lane bypass following the railway line behind Mana with intersections at either end;
2. A 2-lane bypass similarly;
3. Widening Mana Esplanade to operate with an extra lane in one direction at peak times only, with traffic lights to improve local access.

All options were expected to be fundable, all would ease congestion, although the best option would have been a 4-lane bypass. That would remove traffic from Mana and relieve congestion. Local consultation saw loud opposition to doing anything that was affordable. People didn’t want any of the options – they wanted Transmission Gully – ignorant of where the money would come from, as it wasn’t available. They were told Transmission Gully would be 15-20 years away and that Transit was legally bound to not sit back and do nothing about Paremata/Mana in that time. Residents ignorantly asked for money that would be spent on the proposals be spent on Transmission Gully- with the proposals costing around $15-$25 million, and Transmission Gully (then) looking like it would cost over 10x that much, that would have been wasted money as well. Little point in part building a road – it would be a road to nowhere.

Transit was stuck - it either breaches its statutory requirement to maintain and build a safe and efficient highway network, or builds an option the local residents don't want. The Minister of Transport at the time said that the decisions were not for politicians but for (what was then) Transfund and Transit to sort out, with the available funding.

Change in funding framework

Given a lot of the discussion is around decisions on funding, it is worthwhile understanding what the funding framework is for roading.

Around the late 80s, some major changes to how roads were managed and funded were about to be implemented. Up until 1989, road funding in New Zealand was decided by the National Roads Board, chaired by the Minister of Works (who may or may not have also been the Minister of Transport). Lists of projects were developed by district roads councils, which included local politicians, and decisions as to what would proceed, while informed by some analysis, were often politically driven. For example, Taranaki gained many new projects in the late 70s, early 80s, to complement the Think Big projects. The use of roading to shore up votes in marginal electorates was not unknown.

The Transit New Zealand Act 1989 changed this – as part of the reforms of the fourth Labour government – responsibility for funding, planning and building roads was radically altered. This went through several further stages under the Bolger National government, but in general it saw:

- Funding decisions shift from a Ministerially chaired Board to a statutorily independent board (Transfund, now Land Transport New Zealand);
- Decisions on how to prioritise funding move from political whim to statutory criteria (efficiency and safety under National, now more complicated under Labour);
- Funding determined by annual budget shifted to a dedicated fund from road users (the National Land Transport Fund comprising all road user charges, all motor vehicle registration fee, all LPG and CNG tax and now around 22.5c/l of petrol tax – 18.7c goes to the Crown account);
- Planning and development of state highways determined by Transit New Zealand, local authorities bid for funding from Land Transport New Zealand for local roads and public transport;
- Actual construction and maintenance of roads carried out by contractors, as all work is contracted out by competitive tender (Ministry of Works was privatised).

In that framework, politics was more removed from road building than ever before. Road maintenance and emergency work to fix natural disasters was the priority, the all new road projects were ranked according to a formula of benefit/cost analysis to ensure the projects with the biggest bang for their buck (in terms of reducing delay, fuel/maintenance savings, accidents prevented) got funding priority. At the time, when funding was tight (Labour and then National were both trying to eliminate budget deficits and unwilling to let more petrol tax be dedicated to roading), projects only got funded if they had a benefit/cost ratio of 5:1. This effectively meant, very few big projects got funded. In Wellington, there was, on average, only one major project going on at any one time.

Over time, the funding was loosened. National in 1997 increased petrol tax and matched that with an increase in funds from petrol tax dedicated to the National Land Transport Fund. This meant projects with a benefit/cost ratio of 4:1 could proceed. Labour has since increased petrol tax for land transport twice and started dedicating funding directly from the Crown Account into land transport in particular regions. Auckland has been promised $900 million, Wellington $225 million (plus up to $660 for the Western Corridor), Bay of Plenty $150 million (all over 10 years, the Auckland money started in 2004/05). This is funding that could be said to come from general taxation or from the $660 million p.a. gathered from petrol tax for the Crown Account.

Labour also changed the funding framework with the Land Transport Management Act, but largely kept many of the fundamentals intact. Benefit/cost ratios are no longer the decider of funding, although projects should, at least, be efficient, so have a benefit/cost ratio clearly over 1:1. Most projects have benefit/cost ratios over 2.5:1, so are good projects.

Politicians don’t decide what roads proceed and what ones don’t proceed. Local politicians certainly decide what local road projects get punted up to Land Transport New Zealand for funding, and express priorities for Land Transport New Zealand to consider, but ultimately that Board makes the decisions and the Land Transport Management Act explicitly stops the Minister of Transport directing the Board of Land Transport New Zealand on what to fund or not fund. He can advise on priorities and determine how much money goes on groups of activities (i.e. state highway construction), although that has yet to happen, but he wont decide.

Peter Dunne should know this, he voted for the first legislation that made this law in 1988/1989.

National MPs should know this, National strengthened this in the mid 1990s. This is a good thing – politicians are not best placed to decide how to spend road users money on roads. Some of the least politically sexy projects are quite critical and save lives – for example, ten of millions are spent annually on small projects, like widening intersections, realignments, widening bridges, improved lighting, friction surfacing slippery sections of road – projects that in themselves would never be interesting to politicians, but which are critical to eliminating blackspots and improving safety of the network.

In addition, the Land Transport Management Act allowed toll roads to be built, and private investment in new roads – but the toll road has to stack up on its own merits. So far Cabinet has approved tolling of two new roads – the ALPURT B2 motorway extension north of Orewa and the Tauranga HarbourLink project.

Tomorrow: How did Transit respond to the call for Transmission Gully in the '90s? How did the local residents of Plimmerton/Mana stall upgrades to the current highway that would save lives?